UK Flight Safety Committee

UKFSC News #16

25 Feb 2025

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

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
FAA Aviation Safety

SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN

SAIB: 2025-02
SUBJ: DOORS, Main Deck Cargo Door
Date: February 21, 2025

This is information only. Recommendations aren't mandatory.

Introduction

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises owners and operators of **Boeing Model 757-200 series airplanes, converted from passenger to freighter configuration in accordance with Precision Conversions, LLC, Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. ST01529SE,** of an airworthiness concern regarding in-flight opening of the main deck cargo door and recommended actions to mitigate such an event.

At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39. However, the investigation is ongoing, and depending on the investigation results, the FAA may consider rulemaking in the future.

FAA SAIB

B757 Cargo Door In-flight Opening

SKYWISE Tailored news, notifications & alerts from the CAA.

CAA SKYWISE

SRG1430 Change Notification

SKYWISE Tailored news, notifications & alerts from the CAA.

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The latest news from the flight safety world

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By Björn Wylezich Stock.adobe.com

'On 20 December 2012, a PW4168A-engined Airbus A330-200 was climbing through FL220 after departing Phuket at night when sudden uncontained left engine failure occurred.

Engine shutdown and initiation of a return was followed by consequential loss of the green and then blue hydraulic systems. Shortly after this, a relatively uneventful landing followed with only minor damage but "without pilot assessment or knowledge of the safety margin". As the findings of the Investigation raised still-relevant concerns about the way this multiple failure scenario was handled.'

A332, NW of Phuket Thailand

Related Links

Uncontained Engine Failure

Emergency and Abnormal Checklist

Photo from the ATSB accident report

AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUREAU

SA227 Hydraulics System Failure

During a non-scheduled air transport flight the crew experienced a complete loss of pressure in the hydraulic system. Without the hydraulic system, the flaps, nose wheel steering, and landing gear were not functional, however limited braking was available from a an accumulator. The captain conducted a flapless landing and after stopping on the taxiway for a short moment, opted to continue the taxi to the operator's hangar, mistakenly believing that the brakes were functioning. In close proximity to the operator's hangar, the crew applied the brakes to stop the aircraft while on a slight slope, but they were ineffective and the aircraft collided with the hangar.

Contributing factors

A crack in a hydraulic line resulted in a loss of hydraulic pressure. Following the hydraulic system failure, the captain was required to take-on both the pilot flying and pilot monitoring roles. The first officer's inexperience limited their ability to contribute to managing the failure. After stopping on the taxiway, the captain mistakenly assumed the brakes were functioning. Unable to locate or contact the tow tug and influenced by self-imposed pressure, continued the taxi.

Safety action by the operator

• The flight crew received refresher training in human factors, standard operating procedures, workload management and decision-making. Additionally, the captain has completed remedial training on decision-making.
• The captain has completed a series of simulator exercises to confirm all procedures are followed in accordance with the QRH and company standards.
• During their fleet meeting, all fleet pilots were made aware of the incident and the lessons learnt to prevent re-occurrence. • All fleet pilots have completed theory training and examination of the hydraulic system.
• Skippers Aviation is carrying out a review of maintenance practices for tube repairs and replacements for the fleet.

Report

ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY

RAeS Lecture: ESA Director General's Address

10 March 2025 19:00 - 20:00

Insights into the latest developments in the space industry and its key challenges. The lecture will be followed by an audience Q&A.

Registration

EUROCONTROL

RTAB Podcast - Digital iNM

RTAB podcast episode with Tony Licu, shares insights into iNM - the integrated Network Management programme set to modernise EUROCONTROL's systems by 2030.

Listen

EUROCONTROL HINDSIGHT

People in Control? Staying in the loop…Lessons learned from HindSight 36

5th of March 2025 14:00-15:30 CET

With Dr. Steve Shorrock, Senior Team Leader – Human Factors

Registration

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NORWEGIAN SAFETY INVESTIGATION AUTHORITY

A320 Lithium Battery Fire in the Cabin, 11 June 2022

Photo from the NSIA report

At top of descent to Flesland, the cabin crew was alerted by passengers about a fire in the forward part of the cabin. A passenger's cell phone had overheated and caught fire.

The cabin crew members immediately initiated the procedure for fighting lithium-ion battery (LIB) fires, and equipped themselves with water, hand held BCF fire extinguishers, fire proof gloves and breathing equipment. Simultaneously, the flight crew was informed about the situation, and declared an emergency («MAYDAY»).

The cell phone was first cooled by water, which caused the fire and smoke to stop. The phone was secured in a metal container and placed in an aft lavatory. The container was filled with water and monitored for the reminder of the flight. The crew members on board the Wizz Air flight handled the situation quickly and in a very good way. They had relevant equipment available, and followed the necessary procedures to cool down the cell phone battery, and to keep it under control until the aircraft had landed.

Protective gloves are important in order to handle hot or burning batteries. Thus, the NSIA recommends that all operators equip the cabin and the cockpit with easily accessible fire protective gloves in addition to relevant TR and LIB fire equipment kits. It is also important that crew regularly perform TR handling procedure training.

NSIA Report.

By icholakov Stock.adobe.com

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Learjet Rejected Take-off & Runway Overrun

'The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported hearing a "boom" during the takeoff just before reaching V1 and a second "boom" just as he called out V1. The second-in-command (SIC), who was the pilot flying, called to abort the takeoff. Both suspected they had blown tires. They attempted to slow the airplane, but the there was no braking action. The drag chute was deployed but the airplane continued off the end of the runway, traveled through the runway end lights, and into the grass. During the accident sequence, the drag chute separated from the airplane and was located on the runway. Examination of the airplane after the accident revealed that the left main landing gear tyre had ruptured and pieces of the tyre and the left brake system assembly were found along the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing during the accident.

The airplane's maintenance manual recommended that the tire pressures be checked before the first flight of every day. The tire pressure was not checked on the day of the accident, therefore, it could not be determined whether or not the tyres were appropriately inflated at the time of the accident. According to the operator, the drag chute most recent 6-month inspection was complied with on October 26, 2022.'

The NTSB concluded the probable cause as a left main landing gear tyre rupture during takeoff, which resulted in a runway overrun.

NTSB Report.

CAA PUBLICATIONS

SN-2025/002: Department for Transport Security Advice to Air Operators

The purpose of this Safety Notice (SN) is to remind or alert UK aircraft operators to the international security threat and risk information available from the Department for Transport (DfT).

View SN-2025/002

ORS4 No.1620: Carriage of Aerosols without a Subsidiary Hazard on Board an Aircraft

General Exemption authorising aircraft operators who do not have fuel heaters, to carry Aerosols, UN1950, Division 2.1 without a subsidiary hazard as anti-icing additive. Supersedes ORS4 No.1569

View ORS4 No.1620

SN-2025/003: Part 21 Aircraft with Ballistic Parachute Recovery Systems (BPRS) Fitted

This Safety Notice is to advise owners of Part 21 Aircraft with BPRS Fitted that they may wish to install placards described in CAP 482.

View SN-2025/003

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Photo By Navacepe Stock.adobe.com

AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUREAU

Loss Of Control & Collision With Terrain - AS332 Super Puma

On 22 November 2024, at about 0955, while cruising at about 3,500 ft above mean sea level, the pilot noted a high frequency vibration through the airframe that was also apparent to the passenger. The pilot lowered the collective control1 and began a descent, data showed the helicopter was descending at about 1,500 ft/min with an indicated airspeed of about 115 kt.

The pilot reported that, during the descent, they heard a loud thud, which was immediately followed by an uncommanded yaw to the left. To control the yaw, the pilot established an autorotation then indicated that they reduced the throttles to idle, however, inadvertently reduced the no 2 engine throttle beyond the idle gate position resulting in the engine shutting down.

With the reduction in power, the uncommanded yaw ceased, and the pilot initiated a straight-in approach towards open fields. On approaching the ground, the pilot reported that, during the final flare with reduced airspeed, application of the collective control to cushion the landing resulted in the helicopter yawing again. The helicopter landed heavily, initially impacting terrain in an upright attitude but facing in the opposite direction of flight, before rolling onto its right side. The emergency locator transmitter was activated in the impact and there was no post-impact fire. The pilot and passenger survived the impact but were seriously injured. The passenger, who was seated in the forward cabin, succumbed to their injuries. The helicopter was destroyed.

Airbus Helicopters published safety related information, Safety Information Notice 4082-S-64 on 29 November 2024 that highlighted tail rotor assembly maintenance tasks, specific to inspection and lubrication requirements.

•Alert Service Bulletin ASB AS332-64-20-003 on 23 December 2024 that specified an inspection for defects of the splined sleeve radius area of the control plate mount flange. **Report.**

AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUREAU

Smoke In Aircraft And Descent Below Lowest Safe Altitude, 15 Aug 2024

Photo from the ATSB report

After departure from Perth, the crew noted high-temperature air and light smoke emanating from flight deck air vents. The crew commenced the 'smoke in aircraft' checklist but did not complete it. The first officer did not don an oxygen mask and the left bleed air system was not selected 'off'. Subsequently, the left wing overheat light illuminated. The crew then actioned the 'wheel well and wing overheat' checklist, but elected not to extend the landing gear. During the return to Perth, the aircraft deviated both above and below the assigned altitude assigned including a descent to 639 ft below MSA. They completed the ILS approach and landed without further incident.

The ATSB found that a failure within the left air cycle machine resulted in smoke entering the cabin. Items on the 'smoke in aircraft' checklist were not completed. Consequently, the smoke ingress into the cabin continued and the left air conditioning duct overheated, and the wing overheat light illuminated. The first officer's decision not to don an oxygen mask increased their risk of impairment or incapacitation. The decision not to extend the landing gear, as required by the checklist, ignored the possibility of a brake fire or wheel well overheat.

The workload associated with the in-flight response to the smoke in the cockpit and wing overheat adversely affected the flight crew's performance, leading to errors in flight path adherence, checklist completion and decision making.

The first officer readback an air traffic control altitude instruction as 2,000 ft AMSL instead of 2,800 ft AMSL. The controller correct the error. Following a query from the crew, this was later corrected. After the assigned altitude had been confirmed the aircraft descended below the MSA. When advised of the deviation by ATC, the required 'safety alert' wording was not used.

Following the occurrence, the operator conducted a refresher training course for flight crew on emergency response briefings and a theory examination for flight crew on bleed air, pneumatics, pressurisation and fire warning systems. Practical training was held for flight crew on revised emergency procedures and the use of the crew oxygen system. The operator also changed the flight crew training program to include a revised Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) program including more comprehensive oxygen system training and a presentation on the Metroliner 23 oxygen system. **Final Report.**

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

Image from pilotswhoaskwhy.com

PILOTS WHO ASK WHY

A Pilot's Guide to Dealing with Change

In aviation (and life), change really is the only constant. New technology, updated regulations, evolving procedures, and operator take-overs can make our jobs feel like they're always changing. So what are the best strategies for dealing with change?

Read more.


FAA
Aviation Safety

SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN

SAIB: 2025-02
SUBJ: DOORS, Main Deck Cargo Door
Date: February 21, 2025
This is information only. Recommendations aren't mandatory.

FAA SAIB

B757 Main Cargo Door In-flight Opening

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises owners and operators of Boeing Model 757-200 series airplanes, converted from passenger to freighter configuration in accordance with Precision Conversions, LLC, Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. ST01529SE, of an airworthiness concern regarding in-flight opening of the main deck cargo door and recommended actions to mitigate such an event.
At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive. However, the investigation is ongoing, and depending on the investigation results, the FAA may consider rulemaking in the future. **FAA SAIB 2025-02**

CAA SKYWISE

Publication of Change Notification Form SRG1430 Issue 11

SRG1430 Change Notification Form Issue 11 has now been published on the CAA website. Issue 11 has additional guidance added in relation to the completion of section 9b which states the following:

Ensure that the transition phase of this change has been considered and that any potential or required system/ equipment outages that may be necessary during this period are included within this notification. Service providers are to ensure that the **current version of the SRG1430 form** is used.

SW2025/028

CAA SKYWISE

Cargo Compartment Safety Risk Assessment

Regulatory changes to UK Regulation (EU) No. 965/2012 (The Air Operations Regulation) for adoption of new ICAO Annex 6 requirements in the UK, which will establish the requirements, means of compliance and guidance for operators to adequately mitigate risks introduced by unknown entities in the supply chain and to mitigate the consequences of a potential fire hazard due to the presence of incorrectly identified and classified items offered for transport.

Consultation on Changes to UK Regulation (EU) No. 965/2012 with regards to the Specific Cargo Compartment Safety Risk Assessment

Consultation document

SW2025/030

CAA SKYWISE

Revised UKCAA-TCCA Maintenance Arrangement

A revised version of the **Technical Arrangement on Maintenance between UKCAA and Transport Canada (TCCA)** was signed on 14th February 2025.

The revised version includes additional procedures for facilities outside the UK and updated application forms. Moreover, a procedure for authority-to-authority SIS visits has been added and minor editorial changes were incorporated.

SW2025/029

CAA SKYWISE

Airspace Safety: Flying in the North West

Restricted Area EGR323 North West Transit Corridor (NWTC) has replaced the Manchester Low Level Route.

To operate within this restricted area pilots must:

fly an aircraft with a Maximum Certified Take-Off Mass of 40,000 KG or less maintain a minimum in flight visibility of 5 KM use the Manchester or Liverpool QNH (altimeter) setting fly below 1500 feet AMSL keep the indicated airspeed below 140 KTS Detailed information on the NWTC boundaries and operational requirements is included in the UK Aeronautical Information Circular **AIC Y 004/2025.**

We have updated the Airspace & Safety Initiative guidance and advice for pilots **Flying in the North West** including a new guide to **Restricted Area EGR323 NWTC.**

SW2025/031

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Recent Accidents & Incidents from the Air Safety Network Wikibase

Date	Type	Event	Location
17-Feb-25	AW119	Starboard door's window ejection system was inadvertently activated	Altamira
20-Feb-25	AW119	Police, when attempting to evade ground fire they collided with power lines.	Jardim Balneário
18-Feb-25	A320	ATB. Bird strike.	Lahore
19-Feb-25	A320	Missed approaches at dest. and alt. Low fuel emergency declared and diverted.	Parnaíba-Santos
22-Feb-25	A321	Smoke was detected in the cabin. Declared emergency and diverted.	Lisbon
20-Feb-25	A321	ATB. Bird strike.	Rio de Janeiro
23-Feb-25	A321	ATB. Engine issues.	Xian-Xianyang
17-Feb-25	A321	ATB. Bird strike.	Fortaleza-Pinto
22-Feb-25	A330	Odour in the cabin. Diverted.	NW of Ireland
22-Feb-25	A350	ATB, smoke and fumes in the flight deck.	Los Angeles
20-Feb-25	AN2	No.1 engine failure. Diverted.	Krasnoyarks
20-Feb-25	Bell 505	Struck a powerline and crashed on ice.	S of Ririe, ID
18-Feb-25	B737-8	GCOL. Wingtip touched the roof of a container during taxi.	Tallinn-Lennart Meri
22-Feb-25	B737-700	ATB. Bird strike.	Cochabamba
23-Feb-25	B747-400	ATB. Engine failure.	Hong Kong
23-Feb-25	B777-200	Engine failure. Diverted.	Norwegian Sea
23-Feb-25	DHC8	Engine failure.	Fuvahmulah Island
22-Feb-25	DHC8	ATB. Bird strike.	Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
21-Feb-25	DHC8	Turbulence. Two passengers suffered minor injuries.	Bergen
21-Feb-25	DHC8	ATB. Tyre failure.	Tamanrasset-Aguemar
17-Feb-25	C525	Diverted. Bird strike on departure.	Sarasota-Bradenton
17-Feb-25	EC135	Helicopter was impacted by an unknown object, damaging two rotor blades.	Hospital Heliport, PA
20-Feb-25	Kazan	Hard landing after reporting loss of rotor pitch control.	Stavropol
19-Feb-25	NH90	Crashed during a night training exercise in a wooded area	Sierra de Cameros
18-Feb-25	R22	Crashed during an emergency landing in a field	Sankt Augustin
21-Feb-25	S100	ATB. Gear did not retract.	Noyabrsk
20-Feb-25	SA227	RTO. Due to brake failure after initiating the take-off. Hit runway lights.	Denver
18-Feb-25	YAK40	ATB. Engine failure.	Vologda

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Safety Conference Calendar

Year	Month	Day(s)	Org	Event	Location	Notes
2025	Feb	18th	FSF	Advancing Aviation Safety: Integrating Mental Health into Operational Excellence	Online	Webinar
2025	Mar	11th 12th	NTSB	Automation In Transportation: Lessons For Safe Implementation	Washington DC	In person meeting
2025	Mar	12th	UKFSC	470th SIE	TBC	
2025	Mar	17th – 20th	Airbus	29th Airbus Safety Conference	Amsterdam	
2025	Mar	17th – 19th	FRMS Forum	FRMS Forum Annual Conference	Santiago, Chile	
2025	Mar	19th – 20th	RAeS	RAeS Flight Operations Conference 2025: Single Pilot Operations - Logical Progression or a Step Too Far?	Hamilton Place, London	
2025	Mar	24th – 28th	CANSO	Global Safety Conference	Christchurch, NZ	
2025	Mar Apr	31st – 1st	IATA	34th Safety Issue Review Meeting	Montreal, Canada	
2025	Mar Apr	31st – 2nd	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Apr	2nd – 3rd	ERA	Safety Group	TBC	
2025	Apr	7th – 9th	ACSF	ACSF Safety Symposium	Embry Riddle, Daytona Beach, FL	Business aviation
2025	Apr	7th – 9th	FoF	Flight Operations Forum Norway 2025 – Communicate for Safety	Oslo airport	
2025	Apr	28th -30th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	May	6th – 7th	FSF	70th Business Aviation Safety Summit	Charlotte, North Carolina	
2025	Jun	5th – 6th	FSF	Safety Forum 2025 Theme: People in the Centre of Aviation Safety	Eurocontrol, Brussels	
2025	Jun	24th	UKFSC	471st SIE	TBC	
2025	Aug	18th – 20th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Sep	10th	UKFSC	472nd SIE	TBC	
2025	Sep	15th – 17th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Sep/Oct	29th – 4th	ISASI	ISASI 2025 - Soaring to New Heights: A World of Innovation	Denver, Colorado	
2025	Oct	6th – 7th	SAE	Defence Aviation Safety Conference	London	
2025	Oct	14th -16th	IATA	World Safety and Operations Conference	Xiamen, China	
2025	Nov	4th – 6th	FSF	78th International Aviation Safety Summit	Lisbon, Portugal	
2025	Nov	10th – 12th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Nov	11th – 13th	Bombardier	29th Bombardier Safety Standdown	Wichita, Kansas	
2025	Dec	2nd	UKFSC	473rd SIE	TBC	