



UK Flight Safety Committee

# UKFESC News #18

11 Mar 2025



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Preventing Loss of Engine Generators



SKYBRARY

Don't Forget The Pitot Covers



FSF

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CAA SKYWISE

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CAA

TRAINING COM (Spring) 2025



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CAA SKYWISE

Publication of CAPI 724 Flying Display Pilot Authorisation




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### SKYBRARY

## Don't Forget The Pitot Covers

On 27 May 2022, a Singapore Airlines Airbus A350-900 (9V-SHH) was about to depart from Brisbane to Singapore when an uninvolved third party alerted the crew that the pitot covers were still fitted. The investigation found a lack



of robust procedures for pitot cover removal, previously noted with another operator using the same ramp service provider. Three contributing factors were identified, including a maintenance engineer certifying removal without confirmation, unimplemented methods for accounting tooling, and no final walk-around inspection. Four risk-increasing factors included dual roles causing fatigue, untracked work hours, incomplete pre-flight inspections, and limited conspicuity of pitot cover streamers.

### [A359 Brisbane, Austalia, 2022](#)

### Related Links

#### [Pitot Static System](#)

#### [Flight Crew Pre Flight External Check](#)

#### [Standard Operating Procedures \(SOPs\)](#)



### AIRBUS - NEW SAFETY FIRST ARTICLE

## Preventing Loss of Engine Generators on A320 Family, A330 and A340 Aircraft

“Some cases of emergency electrical configurations on A320 aircraft were reported to Airbus where both Integrated Drive Generators (IDGs) failed in sequence due to worn components inside their Constant Speed Drive (CSD).

This article describes one of these events and explains why worn IDGs may have frequency regulation issues in certain circumstances that may lead to emergency electrical configuration. It also presents the preventive maintenance tasks that have been introduced to detect worn IDGs in advance. Recommendations are provided to flight crews to prevent a potential emergency electrical configuration in the case of one generator failure.

### Focus on the IDGs of A320 family, A330 and A340 aircraft

In recent years, Airbus received reports of emergency electrical configuration events on A320 family aircraft due to the loss of both engine generators, as in the event described previously. In all cases, the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) deployed and powered the emergency electrical network. In most cases, the full power supply was restored to the aircraft's electrical network by a successful reset of at least one generator or by starting the APU, which connected its generator to the network.

These events mainly occurred during descent, shortly after a loss of one generator. Some cases of total loss of electrical power have also been reported on ground during Single Engine Taxi Without APU (SETWA) operations.

No similar events were reported on A330 and A340 aircraft, however, the design of the IDG is similar and so these aircraft can also be affected.”

[Read more.](#)

### FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION

## 2025 Safety Forum - Agenda and call for registrations

5 June 2025 - Friday, 6 June, Brussels



### [Further Information](#)

### CAA SKYWISE

## Restricted Airspace – RAF Coningsby – 14 March 2025

Restriction of Flying Regulations for the Royal Air Force Aerobatic Team the Red Arrows at Royal Air Force Coningsby on 14 March 2025. Details by NOTAM and in [AIC M 030/2025](#) on the [NATS website](#). **SW2025/041**

### CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

## TRAINING COM (Spring) 2025

News and advice for the training professional.

[Download TRAINING COM \(Spring\) 2025 as a PDF](#)



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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Runway Incursion

United Airlines (UAL) flight 384, a Boeing 777, landed on runway 4R at Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL) in Honolulu, Hawaii. After landing, the aircraft crossed runway 4L while a Kamaka Air (KMK145) Cessna 208B was landing on runway 4L, resulting in a runway incursion. The closest distance between the two airplanes was 1,173 feet.

The UAL first officer was the pilot flying and landed the airplane on runway 4R. Control was then transferred to the captain, who asked the first officer to notify the tower of their exit plan onto taxiway K. However, before the first officer could notify the tower, the controller contacted UAL and asked if they had reached taxiway Kilo. The first officer responded affirmatively, and the controller instructed the UAL flight crew to hold short of runway 4L on taxiway K. The first officer acknowledged the instruction, but the airplane had already passed the hold-short line and was crossing runway 8L.

The captain was surprised by how quickly the airplane reached runways 4L and 8L after exiting runway 4R. Both the captain and the first officer found it confusing that there was no way to be clear of runway 4R without being on runways 8L/4L. The hold-short line for runway 4L was located less than 200 feet from the edge of runway 4R, which did not accommodate a Boeing 777 clearing the active landing runway.

The area where runways 4L, 4R, and 8L converge was designated as a runway incursion hot spot due to the

risk of aircraft failing to hold short. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acknowledged that the hot spot area did not conform to current airport design standards and intended to work with airport operators to bring non-standard geometry into compliance.

The captain lost situational awareness after entering taxiway K, contributing to his misjudgment of the distance to the hold-short line. The captain also failed to read the hot spot note indicating the risk of failing to hold short. Both flight crewmembers noted that the airport moving map (AMM) did not include a restriction on the use of taxiway K for widebody airplanes, which would have raised their awareness of the risk.

The local controller cleared KMK145 to land on runway 4L and instructed UAL384 to hold short of runway 4L on taxiway K. The controller’s incorrect transmission to the KMK pilot was not a factor in the incident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of the incident to be the airport’s continued use of taxiway Kilo despite the identified risk of pilots failing to stop at the hold-short line. Contributing factors included the operator’s moving map display omitting a restriction on the use of taxiway Kilo for widebody airplanes, the captain’s inadvertent continuance through the hold-short line, and the FAA’s delayed action to remediate the airport’s legacy design.

Final Report.

CAA SKYWISE

Airport assessment requirements for Boeing B777X aircraft

Airports that intend to operate or serve as diversion airports for the Boeing 777X aircraft are required to complete an assessment and compatibility matrix to ensure the airport is suitable for the operation of the aircraft which is equipped with folding wing tips (FWT).

Aerodrome operators will be sent the assessment and compatibility matrix by the Principal Aerodrome Inspectors.

SW2025/036

CAA SKYWISE

Publication of CAP722B Edition 5, UK SORA AMC/ GM and RPC AMC/GM

The CAA has published the ORS9 decision, [ORS9 CAA Decision No.46](#), setting out the UK SORA as Acceptable Means of Compliance to UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947 Article 11. This will become effective on 23 April 2025, and be updated in the [Regulatory Library](#) shortly.

We have also published new Remote Pilot Competence standards as AMC, and an update to [CAP722B](#).

Find out more on our [website](#).

SW2025/035

CAA SKYWISE

Amendment to CAP 2254 Military Aircrew Accreditation Scheme

[ANAmendment\(SA\)toCAP2254 Military Aircrew Accreditation Scheme](#) has been published to amend the credits available towards the issue of a UK Part-FCL LAPL or PPL, to clarify certain credits available towards the issue of a CPL, and to provide credit towards the ATPL theoretical knowledge examinations for the issue of a UK Part-FCL ATPL, for UK military aircrew who are eligible for credits under the Military Aircrew Accreditation Scheme (MAAS).

SW2025/037



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Photo By motive56 Stock.adobe.com

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA

Aft Fuselage Strike on Landing

On 19 October 2022, a DHC-8-314 aircraft experienced an aft fuselage strike during landing at Sandy Lake Airport, Ontario. The incident occurred at 2158 Central Daylight Time during a nighttime landing on Runway 29. The aircraft, initially touched down approximately 350 feet past the runway threshold. The aircraft bounced and briefly became airborne again. The first officer, who was the pilot flying, attempted to soften the second touchdown by pitching the aircraft up, resulting in an aft fuselage strike. The captain, who was the pilot monitoring, took control, brought the throttles to idle, and completed the landing roll with approximately 1600 feet of runway remaining. The aircraft sustained significant damage to the lower aft fuselage structure, but there were no confirmed injuries.

The investigation revealed that the first officer’s attempt to soften the second touchdown by pitching up led to the aft fuselage strike. The captain’s intervention prevented further damage and ensured a safe landing. The nighttime conditions and the initial bounce contributed to the difficulty in controlling the aircraft during the landing sequence.

Findings

Below 500 feet above ground level and while trying to intercept and maintain the appropriate approach path, the pilot flying varied the power setting between 57% and flight idle, likely owing to limited experience operating the aircraft type, and the result was an unstable approach.

Due to insufficient detail in the standard operating procedures and the absence of awareness training on stabilized approach criteria, the pilots did not recognize that significant variations in the power setting had made the approach unstable, and they continued the approach.

The pilot flying, who was relatively inexperienced on the DHC-8 and had received limited guidance on pitch awareness, made a pronounced pitch-up input during the flare. There was insufficient time for the pilot monitoring to arrest this action, and the aircraft’s aft fuselage consequently contacted the runway, causing significant damage.

Not considering pilot experience in crew scheduling can compromise safety by assigning two inexperienced pilots to the same flight. Relying solely on flight crews to report hazards without active flight data monitoring may fail to identify unsafe practices, increasing the risk of their continuation.

Perimeter Aviation LP Safety Actions:

- Incorporated “Dash 8-Q400 Pitch Awareness” video in initial and recurrent cockpit procedures training for DHC-8-100 and DHC-8-300 series.
- Revised DHC-8 SOPs to include target power settings and guidance on “LPV APPR INHIBITED” error message.
- Updated SOPs for DHC-8, SA227, and SA226 to require instrument approach procedures for the intended runway, regardless of weather.
- Developed flight operations quality assurance and line operations safety audit procedures.
- Added the occurrence to the crew resource management course.
- Implemented a command and decision-making course.
- Amended DHC-8 initial simulator training to include excessive pitch recovery and black hole exercises.
- Implemented a restricted crew status list.
- Instituted a flight data monitoring program for DHC-8 and SA227 AC fleet.

The TSB Recommendations:

1. Enhanced Training: Emphasize the importance of proper landing techniques and the risks associated with high pitch attitudes during landing in pilot training programs.
2. Operational Procedures: Review and update operational procedures to ensure clear guidelines for handling bounced landings and the appropriate use of pitch control during landing.
3. Safety Management Systems: Encourage operators to incorporate lessons learned from this incident into their safety management systems to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

Final Report.



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Image from the NSIA final report of the flight data animation

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA

## Sikorsky S-92A Spatial Disorientation 24 Feb 2020

On 24 February 2020, a serious incident occurred involving a Sikorsky S-92A helicopter, registration LN-ONT. The helicopter lost control shortly after take-off from the helipad on the Maersk Invincible oil installation in the North Sea. The departure took place in the dark under demanding conditions, with no external horizon or visual references available to the crew. The helicopter had a crew of two pilots and nine passengers on board.

During the incident, the helicopter lost altitude, direction, and speed, accelerating backwards at a speed of 49 knots over a distance of 210 meters while losing further altitude. After approximately 40 seconds, the crew regained control and continued the flight to Stavanger Airport, Sola, without further incidents.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) determined that the crew was likely exposed to spatial disorientation during take-off. This, combined with overcorrection of the flight controls, caused the helicopter to deviate from the normal departure profile. The lack of an external horizon and the darkness contributed to the disorientation of both crew members.

With no outside horizon and in the dark, both crew members were disoriented. Departures like this can be very demanding, and the importance of uncovering threats to a safe flight ahead of departure is very important. It will contribute to less stress for the crew, and help to ensure good internal communication.

### Safety Actions and Recommendations:

The NSIA recommended that the CAA-N, in its supervisory role with offshore helicopter operators, emphasize the importance of following up on procedures and routines related to Threat and Error Management (TEM), TEM training, and how TEM is managed in daily operations. This recommendation aims to ensure that potential threats to safe flight are identified and mitigated ahead of departure, reducing stress for the crew and improving internal communication.

The NSIA advised Bristow Norway AS to implement “deviation calls” for abnormal pitch variations during flights with passengers. This recommendation aims to address the absence of standard deviation calls for abnormal pitch variations, which can lead to miscommunication and misunderstandings while attempting to re-establish a correct flight profile.

[Final Report](#)

CAA SKYWISE

## Publication of CAP1724 Flying Display Pilot Authorisation and Evaluation (Edition 7)

To participate in a flying display, display pilots are required to obtain a Display Authorisation (DA). Following an earlier consultation, we have published a new edition of [CAP 1724 Flying Display Pilot Authorisation and Evaluation: Requirements and Guidance](#) which contains details on obtaining a DA.  
**SW2025/042**

CAA SKYWISE

## SN-2025/004 UAS Software and Firmware Updates

The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has published a Safety Notice (SN-2025/004) UAS Software and Firmware Updates.

All UAS Operators and Remote Pilots are strongly advised to read the attached Safety Notice and act on the recommendations. It is recommended that Specific Category operators implement the recommendations within the SN, as part of their Operating Manual procedures.

The purpose of this Safety Notice is to highlight the responsibility of a UAS operator and remote pilot to ensure that software and firmware updates are carried out to UAS when required by the manufacturer or by published maintenance procedures adopted and accepted by the operator.

**SW2025/039**

CAA SKYWISE

## Consultation Proposal to amend ATOL Standard Term 1.3

We are proposing to amend ATOL Standard Term 1.3 to provide clarity over when the ATOL protected statement, and logo must be used in advertising in both broadcast and non-broadcast media.

We have produced an [explainer video](#) to introduce this consultation and what we hope to achieve.

We welcome you to [give us your feedback](#), the closing date for this consultation is Wednesday 14 May 2025.

CAA ATOL Policy Team

**SW2025/038**



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PILOTS WHO ASK WHY

The Trap of Plan Continuation Bias

“You’re on final approach after a long shift – fatigued but feeling relieved to be almost home. However, the weather is significantly worse than forecast, which is starting to worry your co-pilot. Still, you’re so close to the finish line.

You’ve briefed the landing, your passengers expect to arrive on time, and ATC is expecting you to continue, right?

A missed approach would mean extra fuel burn, paperwork, and delays. So, you press on – just like many others before you.

This is plan continuation bias in action.”

[Read more.](#)



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Runway Excursion

During landing, the flight crew of an airplane reported that the brakes were not effective. The pilot applied and reapplied the brakes and deployed the thrust reversers (TRs) without success. The co-pilot also attempted to apply the brakes with no effect. The pilot then used the emergency brake, which provided some slowing. Attempting to exit the runway onto a 45° taxiway for additional stopping distance, the airplane slid off the taxiway into the grass. The right main landing gear collapsed, causing substantial damage to the right wing spar.

Examination of the airplane systems revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions. Video and data indicated that the TRs were not deployed during landing. The cockpit

voice recorder was overwritten, and the accident flight communications were unavailable. Simulations suggested reduced deceleration during landing, but could not confirm the status of the airbrakes. Without ground airbrakes, the landing distance exceeded the available runway. Tire skid marks indicated heavy braking.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause to be a loss of braking effectiveness during landing for undetermined reasons, leading to a runway excursion. Overheated brakes due to the extended taxi at a higher power setting in an attempt to burn off fuel to achieve the proper takeoff weight that resulted in a wheel fire during takeoff.

[NTSB Report.](#)

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

Aerodrome Innovation Trials Airside

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) wishes to bring to your attention an important Skywise publication. This update highlights the necessity of obtaining CAP791 approval via the Aerodrome Operator for any innovation trials conducted airside at an aerodrome. Ensuring safety and compliance is paramount as we continue to foster innovation within the aviation sector.

Skywise - Alert: Aerodrome Innovation Trials Airside [SW2024/351](#)

Aerodrome Innovation Trials Airside Aviation innovation trials of new technologies or procedures are crucial for the future safe growth of the industry. When conducted in an airside environment, trials often introduce additional hazards and/or require CAA approved alternative means of compliance (AltMoc).

To ensure safety and regulatory adherence, in addition to any permissions the operators or service providers conducting the trial may require from the CAA, all airside trials at certified and licensed aerodromes require the aerodrome operators to obtain prior CAA approval through the [CAP791 process](#). [CAP1168](#) offers further guidance, including examples of changes that require prior approval via the CAP791 process.

If you are unclear whether prior CAA approval is needed, consult with your aerodrome inspector for additional guidance.

CAA SAFETY NOTICE

SN-2025/004: UAS Software and Firmware Updates

The purpose of this Safety Notice is to highlight the responsibility of a UAS operator and remote pilot to ensure that software and firmware updates are carried out to UAS when required by the manufacturer or by published maintenance procedures adopted and accepted by the operator.

[View SN-2025/004](#)



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Recent Accidents & Incidents from the Air Safety Network Wikibase

| Date                     | Type       | Event                                                                                                            | Location                       |
|--------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <a href="#">09/03/25</a> | R44        | Struck a parked vehicle near HELI pad during landing and crashed                                                 | North Las Vegas                |
| <a href="#">09/03/25</a> | ATR42      | RTO, after hitting a fox during take-off                                                                         | Sapporo                        |
| <a href="#">04/03/25</a> | A320       | ATB, captain incapacitated.                                                                                      | Harbin-Taiping                 |
| <a href="#">06/03/25</a> | A320       | Taxied back from runway with engine issue.                                                                       | Valledupar-Alfonso             |
| <a href="#">03/03/25</a> | A320       | ATB, engine failure.                                                                                             | Bucharest                      |
| <a href="#">02/03/25</a> | A320       | ATB, bird strike.                                                                                                | Near Chicago O’Hare            |
| <a href="#">08/03/25</a> | A320       | ATB, low engine oil level for engine no 1, shut down the engine                                                  | NE of Aktau                    |
| <a href="#">08/03/25</a> | A321       | A tail strike during landing on runway 25                                                                        | Chennai                        |
| <a href="#">07/03/25</a> | AN32       | Crash landed under unknown circumstances                                                                         | Bagdogra                       |
| <a href="#">06/03/25</a> | ATR72      | Landed without one of the nose gear wheels                                                                       | Kathmandu                      |
| <a href="#">06/03/25</a> | B C99      | RW EXC, veered off the runway during departure and struck a light.                                               | O’Neill Municipal              |
| <a href="#">02/03/25</a> | B737-400   | ATB, cabin pressurization failure                                                                                | near Bogotá                    |
| <a href="#">03/03/25</a> | B737-800   | ATB, smoke in the cockpit after departure                                                                        | Sydney                         |
| <a href="#">05/03/25</a> | B737-800   | Diverted, significant loss of power in one of its engines, possibly due to the intake of a bird, during take-off | Buenos Aires                   |
| <a href="#">05/03/25</a> | B747-400   | Diverted, problems with engine number 4                                                                          | Over Germany                   |
| <a href="#">05/03/25</a> | B777-300ER | GCOL, damaged after being stuck by a catering truck                                                              | Milano-Malpensa                |
| <a href="#">06/03/25</a> | B777-300ER | Diverted, failure in the left engine                                                                             | 130 nm NW of Lanzhou           |
| <a href="#">04/03/25</a> | B C17      | GCOL, struck by a vacant private jets during a strong windstorm                                                  | Perot Field                    |
| <a href="#">04/03/25</a> | BD100      | GCOL, collided with a USAF C-17A reportedly due to strong winds                                                  | Perot Field                    |
| <a href="#">04/03/25</a> | BD100      | GCOL, collided with a USAF C-17A reportedly due to strong winds                                                  | Perot Field                    |
| <a href="#">04/03/25</a> | BD100      | RW EXC, RTO, temporary excursion due to a strong wind gust during take-off                                       | Austin-Bergstrom               |
| <a href="#">04/03/25</a> | JS32       | RW EXC, impacted trees following an overrun after landing                                                        | Güeppi                         |
| <a href="#">08/03/25</a> | C525       | ATB, pressurization issue                                                                                        | 60 km north of Shizuoka        |
| <a href="#">03/03/25</a> | C560       | GCOL, struck a hangar with the left-wing during taxi after landing                                               | Denton                         |
| <a href="#">02/03/25</a> | ERJ170     | Diverted, crew reported smelling smoke in the aircraft                                                           | Near Luxembourg                |
| <a href="#">04/03/25</a> | ERJ170     | Bird strike on approach, wing leading edge damage                                                                | Wien-Schwechat                 |
| <a href="#">02/03/25</a> | ERJ195     | Bird Strike on approach damaging engine no.1.                                                                    | Tefé                           |
| <a href="#">04/03/25</a> | HA420      | RW EXC, veered off the left side of the runway due to winds                                                      | San Antonio                    |
| <a href="#">05/03/25</a> | Black Hawk | Damage upon executing an emergency landing                                                                       | Soto Cano                      |
| <a href="#">06/03/25</a> | S100       | ATB, pressure drop in hydraulic system No. 2                                                                     | in the Ryazan area             |
| <a href="#">05/03/25</a> | TU204      | ATB, front landing gear door opened at FL350                                                                     | 137 km from Penza air-<br>port |
| <a href="#">08/03/25</a> | DHC6       | A gear-up landing on its floats on the runway                                                                    | Denpasar                       |



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Safety Conference Calendar

| Year | Month   | Day(s)                              | Org        | Event                                                                                                                    | Location                        | Notes             |
|------|---------|-------------------------------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| 2025 | Feb     | 18th                                | FSF        | <a href="#">Advancing Aviation Safety: Integrating Mental Health into Operational Excellence</a>                         | Online                          | Webinar           |
| 2025 | Mar     | 11 <sup>th</sup> - 12 <sup>th</sup> | NTSB       | <a href="#">Automation In Transportation: Lessons For Safe Implementation</a>                                            | Washington DC                   | In person meeting |
| 2025 | Mar     | 12 <sup>th</sup>                    | UKFSC      | 470 <sup>th</sup> SIE                                                                                                    | TBC                             |                   |
| 2025 | Mar     | 17 <sup>th</sup> – 20 <sup>th</sup> | Airbus     | 29 <sup>th</sup> Airbus Safety Conference                                                                                | Amsterdam                       |                   |
| 2025 | Mar     | 17 <sup>th</sup> – 19 <sup>th</sup> | FRMS Forum | <a href="#">FRMS Forum Annual Conference</a>                                                                             | Santiago, Chile                 |                   |
| 2025 | Mar     | 19 <sup>th</sup> – 20 <sup>th</sup> | RAeS       | <a href="#">RAeS Flight Operations Conference 2025: Single Pilot Operations - Logical Progression or a Step Too Far?</a> | Hamilton Place, London          |                   |
| 2025 | Mar     | 24 <sup>th</sup> – 28 <sup>th</sup> | CANSO      | <a href="#">Global Safety Conference</a>                                                                                 | Christchurch, NZ                |                   |
| 2025 | Mar Apr | 31 <sup>st</sup> – 1 <sup>st</sup>  | IATA       | <a href="#">34<sup>th</sup> Safety Issue Review Meeting</a>                                                              | Montreal, Canada                |                   |
| 2025 | Mar Apr | 31 <sup>st</sup> – 2 <sup>nd</sup>  | UKFSC      | <a href="#">FSO Course</a>                                                                                               | Gatwick                         |                   |
| 2025 | Apr     | 2 <sup>nd</sup> – 3 <sup>rd</sup>   | ERA        | <a href="#">Safety Group</a>                                                                                             | TBC                             |                   |
| 2025 | Apr     | 7 <sup>th</sup> – 9 <sup>th</sup>   | ACSF       | <a href="#">ACSF Safety Symposium</a>                                                                                    | Embry Riddle, Daytona Beach, FL | Business aviation |
| 2025 | Apr     | 7 <sup>th</sup> – 9 <sup>th</sup>   | FoF        | <a href="#">Flight Operations Forum Norway 2025 – Communicate for Safety</a>                                             | Oslo airport                    |                   |
| 2025 | Apr     | 28 <sup>th</sup> -30 <sup>th</sup>  | UKFSC      | <a href="#">FSO Course</a>                                                                                               | Gatwick                         |                   |
| 2025 | May     | 6 <sup>th</sup> – 7 <sup>th</sup>   | FSF        | <a href="#">70th Business Aviation Safety Summit</a>                                                                     | Charlotte, North Carolina       |                   |
| 2025 | Jun     | 5 <sup>th</sup> – 6 <sup>th</sup>   | FSF        | <a href="#">Safety Forum 2025 Theme: People in the Centre of Aviation Safety</a>                                         | Eurocontrol, Brussels           |                   |
| 2025 | Jun     | 24 <sup>th</sup>                    | UKFSC      | 471 <sup>st</sup> SIE                                                                                                    | TBC                             |                   |
| 2025 | Aug     | 18 <sup>th</sup> – 20 <sup>th</sup> | UKFSC      | <a href="#">FSO Course</a>                                                                                               | Gatwick                         |                   |
| 2025 | Sep     | 10 <sup>th</sup>                    | UKFSC      | 472 <sup>nd</sup> SIE                                                                                                    | TBC                             |                   |
| 2025 | Sep     | 15 <sup>th</sup> – 17 <sup>th</sup> | UKFSC      | <a href="#">FSO Course</a>                                                                                               | Gatwick                         |                   |
| 2025 | Sep/Oct | 29 <sup>th</sup> – 4 <sup>th</sup>  | ISASI      | <a href="#">ISASI 2025 - Soaring to New Heights:A World of Innovation</a>                                                | Denver, Colorado                |                   |
| 2025 | Oct     | 6 <sup>th</sup> – 7 <sup>th</sup>   | SAE        | <a href="#">Defence Aviation Safety Conference</a>                                                                       | London                          |                   |
| 2025 | Oct     | 14 <sup>th</sup> -16 <sup>th</sup>  | IATA       | <a href="#">World Safety and Operations Conference</a>                                                                   | Xiamen, China                   |                   |
| 2025 | Nov     | 4 <sup>th</sup> – 6 <sup>th</sup>   | FSF        | <a href="#">78th International Aviation Safety Summit</a>                                                                | Lisbon, Portugal                |                   |
| 2025 | Nov     | 10 <sup>th</sup> – 12 <sup>th</sup> | UKFSC      | <a href="#">FSO Course</a>                                                                                               | Gatwick                         |                   |
| 2025 | Nov     | 11 <sup>th</sup> – 13 <sup>th</sup> | Bombardier | <a href="#">29<sup>th</sup> Bombardier Safety Standdown</a>                                                              | Wichita, Kansas                 |                   |
| 2025 | Dec     | 2 <sup>nd</sup>                     | UKFSC      | 473 <sup>rd</sup> SIE                                                                                                    | TBC                             |                   |