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TSB CANADA

DHC-8 Runway Overrun
Accident Report

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has published the [final report](#) into the Porter Airlines DHC-8 runway overrun.

The report finds that ‘the limited visual cues at night meant the crew were not aware of the proximity of the end of the runway and delayed lowering the nose and the application of full braking. With 850’ remaining full braking was applied, but did not prevent the overrun, possibly because of the surface texture in the last 300’ of the runway and air contamination of the hydraulic system.’

The actions required by the report:

- Transport Canada (TC) to demonstrate that the residual risk at airports with runways that are not required to comply with ICAO’s 150 m standard is as low as reasonably practicable; and
- TC to require operators of airports with runways longer than 1800 m that have a runway end safety area shorter than ICAO’s recommended length of 300 m to conduct formal runway-specific risk assessments and to take action to mitigate the risks of overruns to the public, property, and the environment.

Despite the actions taken to date, the number of runway overruns in Canada has remained constant since 2005 and demands a concerted effort to be reduced.’

The report includes details of the safety measures taken by Porter Airlines to prevent a re-occurrence.



Photograph from the TSB report.



AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUREAU

In-Flight Fire and Cabin Smoke
Involving Saab 340A, VH-KDK

‘While in the cruise at 22,000 ft and passing to the east of Cobar, New South Wales, the flight crew received a cargo smoke indication on the central warning panel. As a precaution, the crew fitted their oxygen masks and smoke goggles. Shortly after, the cockpit filled with smoke.’

What the ATSB Found

‘The ATSB found that a likely failure of the right recirculating fan electronic box sub-assembly resulted in an in-flight fire under the cabin floor. The fire filled the cabin with smoke, which then entered the flight deck due to a smoke barrier curtain not being fitted in place and the flight deck door being open.

When the crew fitted their oxygen masks, it was found that the first officer’s mask microphone was not working correctly, which delayed emergency checklists being actioned. The fire also caused substantial structural damage and led to a breach of the fuselage, resulting in a depressurisation of the aircraft.’

‘It was also found that the Rex flight crew had not been trained or had knowledge of the differences in the cargo-configured Saab 340 aircraft, leading to them having no familiarity with specific systems fitted. This prevented them from completing some of the required steps in the emergency checklists.

The flight crew did not receive training on cargo-configured aircraft differences prior to conducting freight operations. Further, the operator’s flight crew operating manuals did not reflect the differences in the cargo-configured aircraft interior checklists, which may have alerted the flight crew to these differences during pre-flight preparation. Additionally, the manufacturer did not have any specific pre-flight check for correct fitment of the smoke barrier curtain for cargo-configured aircraft preparation.’

[The report](#) details the required safety issues and actions to be taken.

AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
BRANCH

Reporting An Air Accident
or Serious Incident

This animation, created by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, provides information about what to do if you are involved in or have witnessed an air accident or serious incident.



[YouTube Video here.](#)

CAA PUBN NOTIFICATION

EASA EAD 2024-0215-E:
Airbus Helicopters EC 225
LP : Main Rotor – Hub
Sleeves – Inspection

EASA Emergency Airworthiness
Directive

[...view EASA EAD 2024-0215-E](#)

OPS GROUP

Dodging Danger: The
Three Routes Through the
Middle East

In response to questions from business aviation operators, the Ops Group have published a briefing on routes through the Middle East.

[Read more here.](#)



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SKYBRARY

Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) (SKYclip)

CPDLC (SKYclip)



Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC)

‘This article gives an overview of Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC). It describes the main principles, the different data link services and the basics of CPDLC operations, including related phraseology. The goal is to provide background information for understanding the safety issues related to this technology.’

CPDLC General Safety Considerations

‘This article describes the safety issues related to and use of Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC). While CPDLC is expected to contribute to an improved safety of flight operations there are some issues that could lead to safety occurrences unless properly addressed. The main objective of the article is to identify some best practices for CPDLC users (both pilots and controllers) and provide ideas for mitigation actions to be taken if safety is threatened.’



Impact of Space Weather on Aviation

‘Space weather refers to natural perturbations coming from the sun or from space that can influence the performance and reliability of space-borne, ground-based or airborne systems and can endanger human life or health.

Solar activity is not constant and, from time to time, eruptions appear on the sun’s surface which result in an abnormal level of radiation and of particle ejection. The radiation and particles are thrown into space and, if directed towards the earth, will arrive after a certain interval. Three different space weather events which effect the earth are CME’s (Coronal Mass Ejections), SEP’s (Solar Energetic Particles) and Solar Flares. These vary in times to reach the earth from as little as 8 minutes with solar flares travelling at the speed of light to as long as a day with CME’s.’

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION

Global Accident Dashboard





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NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES



Shaping a safe and efficient integrated airspace for the future

‘With the accelerating growth of the uncrewed and advanced air mobility sectors, the global aviation landscape is poised for significant change. More and more new and diverse airspace users are lining up for access to our skies, supported by a multitude of air traffic service providers.’

‘The NATS OpenAir proposition is our response to the challenge of meeting increased future demand for access to our skies from a variety of new users by creating a safe and efficient integrated airspace that is open to all crewed and uncrewed aircraft on a fair and equitable basis.’

More information and view the explanatory video [here](#).

NATS request that written responses are submitted by 31 January 2025 using the [online answer form](#).

UK CAA SKYWISE

Draft H8 method statement and business planning guidance

Following a request from the airline community the CAA have extended the response deadline for their [consultation on a draft method statement and business planning guidance for H8](#).

For responses to the [consultation](#) on the draft method statement the CAA are now requesting responses by 17:00 on 13 December 2024.

For responses on the cost of capital, the [FTI report](#) and the specific questions identified in chapter 2 on the cost of capital, the CAA are now requesting responses by 17:00 on 15 January 2025.

SW2024/323

NASA ASRS CALLBACK

NASA Air Safety Reporting System November CALLBACK Focusses on Ramp Safety

‘To an interested observer, ramp operations at a modern-day airport may appear specialized and complex. Diverse, highly technical activities can occur in congested space, appearing chaotic, fast-paced, and dangerous. Arguably, a Ramp Area could be characterized as a hazardous work environment.’ Read [more here](#).

UK CAA SKYWISE

UKADS: NERL Licence – Illustrative proposals

The CAA published a [complementary consultation](#) providing illustrative information on changes to NERL air traffic service licence obligations, costs and charges that might be needed to implement proposals set out in CAP3029, a joint CAA-DfT consultation on proposals for creating a UK Airspace Design Service. This complementary consultation closes on 9 January 2025 (although the [joint CAA-DfT consultation](#) still closes on 17 Dec 2024).

SW2024/322

Consumer Panel Work Programme 2024 – 2026

The CAA [Consumer Panel](#) provides a consumer perspective on all aspects of the CAA’s work.

The Panel’s [new work programme](#) from November 2024 to November 2026 is now published.

SW2024/319



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AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH

AAIB Report: B737 Eventful Go-Around from Intermediate Approach above the Glideslope

Synopsis

After an unstable ILS approach, a manually flown go-around (GA) was initiated at 1,940 ft amsl and 3.6 nm from touchdown. During the approach the mode control panel altitude display was set to 100 ft, but not reset to the missed approach altitude (MAA), prior to the GA being commenced. In the GA the aircraft committed a level bust as it climbed through the MAA of 3,000 ft amsl. Upon recognising this the PF pitched the aircraft down and entered a descent, having reached a maximum altitude 4,030 ft amsl. During the descent the aircraft reached a nose-down attitude of 17.7° and 295 KIAS, with Flaps 5 extended before a recovery and climb was initiated, during which its lowest recorded height was 1,740 ft agl. After the recovery was commenced the EGPWS warning sounded. The entire event occurred with the aircraft in IMC.

Prior to the GA the MAA was not checked by either pilot and during the GA the PF was fixated on the flight directors and expected them to command the aircraft to level off. There have been several serious incidents which occurred during go-arounds with similar factors to that found in this investigation involving EI-HET.

Although EI-HET is a Boeing 737-8200 [MAX], the incident could have occurred in any variant of the Boeing 737, or any other type of aircraft with similar autopilot and flight director systems.

As a result of this serious incident the operator has taken three **Safety Actions**:

- 1. Re-emphasised to all pilots the correct go-around procedure via a mandatory learning module.
- 2. Introduced a training package covering high energy approaches and all engines go arounds, demonstrating non-standard or unexpected go-around conditions, in their ‘summer 2024’ recurrent training package.
- 3. Introduced a ‘Discontinued Approach Procedure’ in June 224 that can be used when an approach is ceased prior to glideslope capture or if the approach gate requirements in its operations manual cannot be achieved. This was backed up with a Chief Pilot Alert to all pilots, via their portable electronic devices, highlighting this serious incident and the new procedure. This procedure is included in Appendix A of [the report](#).

UK CAA SKYWISE

Introducing the Application Form Submission Service

A new digital process for managing your Part 66 Aircraft Maintenance Licence is now available via the [CAA Customer Portal](#). This replaces existing PDF and online applications forms (SRG1014) on 17 December 2024, and will allow applicants to track the progress of their application. More information regarding the new process can be found on the [Application for Initial/Amendment/Renewal of Part 66 Aircraft Maintenance Licence \(AML\) webpage](#).

There will be a 4-week transition period to enable anyone who has already started completing an application to submit this to the CAA. After 17 December 2024 form SRG1014 will be withdrawn and no longer accepted. This new online form can be used for the issue, amendment, renewal or replacement of Part 66 licences. Applications for BCAR licences and Welders approvals should be submitted using the existing PDF forms.

SW2024/320

UK CAA SKYWISE

Manchester Low-Level Route Airspace Change Approved

The UK Civil Aviation Authority has approved [an airspace change to the Manchester Low-Level Route \(MLLR\)](#), which will see the MLLR replaced with a new volume of airspace, EGR323 North West Transit Corridor.

Key changes include reclassification to Class G airspace, a Restricted Area for enhanced safety, an altitude increase to 1500ft, and widening the airspace to the east.

This amendment will come into effect on 20th February 2025. The current exemption enabling the MLLR, ORS4 No.1596, will also expire as the new North West Transit Corridor takes effect.

SW2024/321



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Recent Accidents & Incidents from the [Air Safety Network](#) Wikibase

Date	Type	Event	Location
22-Nov-24	AS332 S Puma	Ferry. ELT signal found crashed	Hay, NSW
21-Nov-24	AS350 B3	Loss of power inflight forced landing	Pretoria
20-Nov-24	An28	ATB due technical	Magadan Sokol UHMM
18-Nov-24	An74	Diversion due vibration from open RH gear door	Dikson Airport, Krasnoyarsk Krai
19-Nov-24	AS350B3	Tail rotor malfunction, emergency landing.	Aysén region
18-Nov-24	B737-8	ATB due left engine fire	Phoenix KPHX
25-Nov-24	B737-4	Crashed on ILS to RW19	Vilnius Airport (VNO/EYVI)
21-Nov-24	B737-8	Lightning strike parked on gate	Cleveland-Hopkins KCLE
20-Nov-24	B737-8	Ground collision with A320	Kinshasa-N'Djili Airport (FIH/FZAA)
21-Nov-24	B737-8	Bird strike No. 2 engine diverted to Jo'burg	Lanseria (FALA)
20-Nov-24	B737-8	ATB due loss of No.1 Engine bleed	Syzran, Samara region
18-Nov-24	B757	Turbulence in cruise. 1 FA injured.	Cooper Hill, MO
19-Nov-24	B767	Runway overrun RW08L	Vancouver (YVR/CYVR), BC
25-Nov-24	B777	Arriving to gate, wing tip strike with parked A321	Boston-Logan (BOS/KBOS)
24-Nov-24	750 Citation X	Landed with NLG retracted	Washington-Dulles (IAD/KIAD)
22-Nov-24	DHC-8	ATB engine shut down	S of Stokmarknes
22-Nov-24	DHC-8	Commenced taxi with GPU attached.	Yakutsk Airport (YKS/UEEE)
21-Nov-24	DA42 Twin Star	Crashed after take-off on training	Ben Slimane Airport (GMD/GMMD)
20-Nov-24	EMB-201	Engine fire, forced landing	near Palmeira das Missões, RS
24-Nov-24	ERJ-195LR	ATB due cracked windscreen	Slantsy District, Leningrad Region
20-Nov-24	F100	ATB, cracked windscreen	Mehrabad (THR/OIII)
18-Nov-24	G280	Lateral runway excursion on landing	Fulton County (KFTY), Atlanta, GA
19-Nov-24	Let 410	Lateral runway excursion	Lankien Airstrip
19-Nov-24	Saab 340B	Engines started with propellor bridle strap at-tached.	Melbourne (MEL/YMML)
21-Nov-24	S100	ATB. 2 A/P, 3 IRS failed, FBWCS in direct mode	near Babchitsy, Novgorod region
24-Nov-24	S100	Hard landing, fuel spill and fire	Antalya Airport (AYT/LTAI)

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Safety Conference Calendar

Year	Month	Day(s)	Org	Event	Location	Notes
2024	Nov	20 th	RIN	3rd Annual UK PNT Leadership Seminar	The Royal Society, London	GNSS Spoofing – RH to attend and report to SIE
2024	Dec	3 rd – 4 th	ERA	Joint Safety & Operations Group meeting	EASA HQ, Cologne	
2024	Dec	4 th	UKFSC	469 th SIE	Aviation House, Gatwick	
2025	Mar	12 th	UKFSC	470 th SIE	TBC	
2025	Mar	TBC	Airbus	Airbus Safety Conference	TBC	
2025	Mar	19 th – 20 th	RAeS	RAeS Flight Operations Conference 2025: Single Pilot Operations - Logical Progression or a Step Too Far?	Hamilton Place, London	
2025	Mar	24 th – 28 th	CANSO	Global Safety Conference	Christchurch, New Zealand	
2025	Mar Apr	31 st – 1 st	IATA	34 th Safety Issue Review Meeting	Montreal, Canada	
2025	Mar Apr	31 st – 2 nd	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Apr	2 nd – 3 rd	ERA	Safety Group	TBC	
2025	Apr	28 th - 30 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	May	6 th – 7 th	FSF	70th Business Aviation Safety Summit	Charlotte, North Carolina	
2025	Jun	5 th – 6 th	FSF	Safety Forum 2025 Theme: People in the Centre of Aviation Safety	Eurocontrol, Brussels	
2025	Jun	24 th	UKFSC	471 st SIE	TBC	
2025	Aug	18 th – 20 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Sep	10 th	UKFSC	472 nd SIE	TBC	
2025	Sep	15 th – 17 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Oct	6 th – 7 th	SAE	Defence Aviation Safety Conference	London	
2025	Nov	4 th – 6 th	FSF	78th annual International Aviation Safety Summit	Lisbon, Portugal	
2025	Nov	10 th – 12 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Dec	2 nd	UKFSC	473 rd SIE	TBC	