



UK Flight Safety Committee

UKFSC News #15

18 Feb 2025



Image by Jeremy Snively from Pixabay_

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Leap Engine Load Reduction Device Causes Cockpit Smoke



By Gatherina Stock.adobe.com

SKYBRARY

Getting the Most Out of In Seat Rest



By Es sarawuth Stock.adobe.com

RAeS

RAeS RPAAS Conference 2025



EUROCONTROL

What’s the Issue with Capacity?



By Karol Stock.adobe.com

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CHIRP

Cabin Crew FEEDBACK Ed 85



CAA SKYWISE

Part 26 Compliance



CAA SKYWISE

Recognised ID - ATC Licence



CAA PUBLICATION

EASA EAD 2025-0039-E: Airbus Helicopters EC 175B: Fuselage – Pylon Reinforcement Fittings –



FSF

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SKYBRARY

Getting the Most Out of In Seat Rest

This is the process whereby pilots may take short periods of sleep (naps), while temporarily relieved of operational duties in accordance with carefully prescribed ‘controlled rest’ procedures, when part of a two-person operating crew of an in-flight aeroplane.



By Gatherina Stock.adobe.com

Where in seat rest is approved as ‘controlled rest’, Operations Manuals should contain procedures for its use and these should take precedence over anything in this article. If there is no such guidance and no explicit prohibition of the practice, then the following practical considerations when planning and undertaking such rest may be useful in helping to maximise the benefit whilst minimising the risks. They are based on the procedures developed by ICAO / IFALPA / IATA.

Links

[Flight Crew In-Seat Rest](#)

[Fatigue](#)

[Pilot Fatigue \(SKYclip\)](#)



Image by Jeremy Snavelly from Pixabay_

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Leap Engine Load Reduction Device Causes Cockpit Smoke

On 20/12/2023, Southwest 554, B737-8, departing New Orleans, ingested a bird in the left engine during the initial climb out. The aircraft returned to the airport. The aircraft began to “shake violently with a distinct loss of thrust” in the No. 1 engine. The left engine master caution fire warning light and the engine fire switch illuminated, and the fire bell sounded. The captain called for Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage checklist. The flight deck began to fill with “acrid white smoke.” The FO stated that he could not clearly see the captain. The pilots donned their masks, and completed the checklist.

The Leap 1B engines incorporate a load reduction device (LRD) designed to minimize aircraft and engine damage during a significant fan imbalance. The design was intended disconnect the fan from the drive, reducing the severity of the vibration. LRD devices are a mechanical design feature and do not require any pilot intervention. When the LRD activates due to excessive vibration, engine

oil enters the compressor upstream of the pneumatic bleed ports, which supply bleed air to the cabin and flight deck from the No. 1 engine.

Safety Actions

After the MSY event, Boeing released a Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin and made updates to the systems description in the Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM), and the Quick Reference Handbook. CFM International, in collaboration with Boeing, has begun work on a software design update. [The proposed software update is intended to automatically close the Pressure Regulating Shut Off Valve in this scenario]. In addition, Southwest notified their pilots.

The Seattle Times published a leaked internal FAA document recommending that take-offs should be conducted with Pack-1 off, to prevent cockpit smoke during a critical phase of flight. The NTSB investigation is ongoing.

[Preliminary Report](#)

[Mentour Pilot \(YouTube\)](#)

ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY

RAeS Remotely Piloted and Autonomous Aircraft Systems (RPAAS) Conference 2025

London and online on 23-24 April, with an early bird ticket offer available until 3 March!

[Information & Booking](#)

EUROCONTROL

What’s the issue with capacity?

28 February 2025, 15:00-16:00 CET

This Webinar explores the main causes of capacity constraints and what can be done to address them.

[Register](#)

NATS

New Departure Wake Turbulence Separation at LGW (RECAT-EU)

Effective 6th March 2025

Pilot Briefing Paper 01/25 is available from kk.ops@nats.co.uk

[AIC SUP 006/2025](#)



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AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BRANCH

Fuel Mayday

G-TUIB had crossed the Atlantic and was holding to make an approach into Manchester Airport (MAN), on a day of significant weather disruption owing to the high wind conditions that were forecast to affect the northern half of the UK. The commander then elected to divert to the nominated alternate of East Midlands Airport (EMA) but was denied because of capacity constraints at EMA and instead diverted to Birmingham Airport (BHX). On final approach to BHX, the aircraft encountered windshear and carried out a missed approach. A fuel emergency was declared and the aircraft subsequently landed below final reserve fuel after its second approach.

The following safety actions were taken:

East Midlands ATC clarified that:

1. The airport’s Centre Control Room (CCR) was responsible for communicating the type and number of aircraft that the airport can accept to ATC and,

2. Any requests for additional or larger aircraft were to be passed to the CCR to make a decision.



Birmingham ATC issued an internal Safety Bulletin which emphasised that when an aircraft has declared an emergency: 1) Controllers provide an aircraft in an emergency with flight priority category A and ensure that it has an uninterrupted approach to the selected aerodrome and rearrange the traffic pattern if necessary and,

2) When it is known that the emergency aircraft is committed to landing at the selected aerodrome, units shall consider the sterilisation of the landing runway. **AAIB Report.**



Photo from the accident report.

INTERSTATE AVIATION COMMITTEE

AN26 Landed Short of the Runway

The accident occurred on a passenger flight during an approach with the cloud base below minima.

The crew did not check the alternate weather or discuss a diversion.

The aircraft was slightly overweight for the landing runway.

A VOR approach was flown below the approach profile, which was not pointed out by the navigator or the copilot. The aircraft descended below the MDA without the required visual reference

The report concluded that the crew should have been able to see the PAPI, that were on full intensity, when the aircraft was at 70m, 2000m from the threshold in a visibility of 2400m.

The PIC misidentified the lead in road as the runway.

The speed reduced below VRef at 35m, the navigator and copilot called speed 200km/h low at 20m and pointed out the runway.

The PIC replied “I don’t understand! Takeoff!” called go-around and pitched up. At 165km/h the Flight Engineer applied go-around thrust.

At 125km/h 960 metres short of the runway the aircraft collided with a snow barrier.

The translation appears to say that a form of GPWS was switched off.

The recommendations address all of the above, including CRM.

IAC Final Report.

CAA SKYWISE

Operations Manuals for RPAS operators with and without approval to carry dangerous goods

The [examples of templates](#) of Operations Manuals for RPAS operators with and without approval to carry dangerous goods as cargo have been updated in line with changes to the 2025-2026 Edition of the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air.

Operators should use the template that is appropriate to their operation and complete it according to their company’s procedures, instructions and policies in line with Guidance on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods as Cargo for UAS/RPAS Operators in the [Specific Category provided by CAP 2555.](#)

SW2025/026





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TSB OF CANADA

Hard Landing And Aft Fuselage Strike



The captain was PF for an approach to runway 27 with a wind of 350/11 at a speed of VRef +10kt. At 267’ the PF disconnected the autopilot. At 135’ the aircraft was at 126kt and 700fpm, and pitch 3.2°. At 20’, 124kt, descent rate 980fpm, pitch 1.1°. The headwind decreased from 5.5 knots to 0.5 knots within 3 seconds, and the descent rate increased to 1050fpm. The PF increased the pitch from 1.1° to 6.8°. The power was consistently at 14% torque. The right main landing gear contacted the runway, followed by the left main

landing gear. 3.51g acceleration was recorded. The aircraft bounced, and a go-around initiated. Two seconds later, a second runway contact occurred with a recorded acceleration of 1.42 g.

After the first touchdown, the TOUCHED RUNWAY warning light illuminated, indicating that the tail strike sensor had triggered. A visual circuit was flown.

Following the occurrence, the debriefed the crew, who then completed a return to flying program. A section was added to the pilot report form for feedback on individual runway approaches and departures. This will be added to the company route manual. SOPs were revised such that during the recovery after a bounced landing, pilots are to “apply full power and maintain a pitch attitude of no more than 6 degrees until the aircraft has reached an altitude where a tail strike is not possible, then continue with the normal go-around.” [TSB Final Report.](#)

NTSB

AS350B Engine Failure

The flight crew had completed their aerial observation and were en-route to the destination. While en-route, the pilot felt a violent yaw to the right, saw the engine low pressure annunciator illuminate, and heard the low rotor horn. After the engine lost power, the pilot transferred the control to the copilot, who performed an autorotation and landed the helicopter in a brush-covered field. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the tail boom and main rotor.



By JackF Stock.adobe.com

NTSB probable cause: The fatigue failure of the fuel control unit control lever arm, which resulted in fuel starvation, and a loss of engine power. [NTSB Report.](#)

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA

B737-800 Runway Overrun

The approach was conducted with the autopilot (AP) and autothrottle (AT) engaged and the captain as pilot flying. At 600’ in IMC, the captain mentally rehearsed the go-around actions. At 300’, visual, the AP was disconnected. Shortly before landing, the captain intended to press the AT disengage switch, but inadvertently pressed the takeoff/go-around (TOGA) switch. This slip likely occurred due in part to the captain’s level of fatigue, and because he was primed to press TOGA switch, having mentally rehearsed a go-around. The inadvertent TOGA selection at 70 feet occurred during when the flight crew’s focus was outside. The AT commanded go-around thrust, the captain held the thrust levers near idle during the flare and landing.

The aircraft touched down with the left reverse thrust lever locked stowed as per the MEL. When selecting the right reverse thrust lever following touchdown, the pilot removed his hand from the forward thrust levers, allowing the left one to advance, undetected, as commanded by the AT. This had a number of consequences: the speed brakes, which had briefly deployed, retracted and the auto-brake system deactivated. The captain immediately encountered difficulty with directional control of the aircraft and initiated manual braking. The captain stowed the No. 2 thrust reverser and was able to keep the aircraft on the runway surface while applying manual braking. There was 2500 feet of runway remaining, travelling at a ground speed of 115 knots with no speed brakes, one engine at near maximum thrust, and the other nearing maximum reverse



By primestockphotography Stock.adobe.com

thrust. At this speed and in this configuration, there was insufficient runway remaining to stop the aircraft and it overran the end of the runway at 45 knots, stopping 300’ from the pavement edge and 500’ from the runway end.

The captain had accrued a significant sleep debt in the week before the occurrence and was operating the aircraft after a nearly 18-hour wake period, at the end of a circadian low.

The TSB found two risks. 1) If pilots do not monitor their rest to assess if they have accrued a sleep debt, there is an increased risk of fatigue going undetected and unmitigated. 2) If the underlying issue behind a persistent maintenance defect is not addressed in a timely manner, there is a risk that it may compound, resulting in a serious consequence.

The safety action taken by the airline was to replace individual AP and AT disengaged call-outs with a “MANUAL FLIGHT” call-out which requires both autopilot and autothrottle to be disengaged at the same time.

[TSB Report.](#)



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By serdiukov Stock.adobe.com

CHIRP

Cabin Crew FEEDBACK Edition 85

Flights Reach Record High.

As the majority of CHIRP reports received in 2024 reveal the increasing pressures faced by crew members, whether it’s perceived pressure or actual pressure, the effect on the crew member can be the same. Passengers may not see these difficulties, but behind the friendly greetings and great service, many crew members are increasingly finding it difficult to strike a balance between safety and service.

CHIRP Cabin Crew FEEDBACK Edition 85.

CAA SKYWISE

Part 26 Compliance for Aircraft Owners and Operators in Respect of 26.370

A change to the UK Regulation (EU) 2015/640 (Part 26) in 2021 introduced a requirement for continuing structural integrity programme for ageing aircraft structures, placing some obligations on the Type Certificate Holder (TCH) of UK registered aircraft and the Supplementary Type Certificate Holder (STCH) where the STC is embodied on a UK registered aircraft.

Additionally, aircraft owners, operators and CAMO of aircraft within the scope of that Regulation are required to implement any necessary amendments to the aircraft maintenance programme (AMP) in line with 26.370.

[ORS4 No. 1619 exemption has been issued to extend the time limit of 26 February 2025](#) to allow sufficient time for the AMPs to be updated with the information obtained from the TCHs and STCHs.

SW2025/027

CAA PUBLICATION

EASA EAD 2025-0039-E: Airbus Helicopters EC 175B: Fuselage – Pylon Reinforcement Fittings – Inspection

EASA Emergency Airworthiness Directive. This AD supersedes EASA Emergency AD 2024-0252-E dated 23 December 2024. [View EASA EAD 2025-0039-E](#)

CAA SKYWISE

Update to recognised professions for air traffic licence applications

Any ATS application form submitted which requires a licence or certificate to be reissued, is required to be submitted with a certified copy of ID. (This can be a Certified copy of your valid Passport or temporary or full and valid photographic UK driving licence).

This is to ensure that an applicant has declared their true identity; so that a certificate, licence or rating is issued with the correct details and to ensure that documents are sent to the correct person.

There are two ways to provide your ID document: by providing a photograph of you holding your photo ID and by providing a certified copy of your photo ID. More guidance on how to provide the ID documents can be found on our website: [Supporting documentation for air traffic licensing applications | Civil Aviation Authority](#)

A list of times when the CAA will require proof of identity is provided.

Please ensure that certified ID is provided with all application submissions. Failure to do so may result in a delay in your application being processed.

SW2025/024



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Recent Accidents & Incidents from the Air Safety Network Wikibase

Date	Type	Event	Location
12-Feb-25	A319	Lateral runway excursion on landing.	Mexico City
14-Feb-25	A320	ATB, cabin pressure issue FL300 in the climb	near Barcelona
14-Feb-25	A321	Aeroflot Russian International Airlines	Moskva-Sheremetyevo
09-Feb-25	A330	Struck by mobile airstairs while parked	Honolulu
11-Feb-25	A330	ATB due to a compressor stall on take-off	Dublin
16-Feb-25	A330	ATB, cracked windscreen.	Thailand
11-Feb-25	AN24	Overran the runway after landing	Utrenniy Airport
10-Feb-25	AN26	Runway excursion.	N'Délé Airport
09-Feb-25	ATR72	Enroute engine failure	Las Palmas
14-Feb-25	B200 KA	Lateral runway excursion while taxiing	São Paulo
12-Feb-25	Huey	Hit by bullets in a conflict with criminals	Rio de Janeiro
11-Feb-25	B737-8	RTO, collided with a vehicle during take-off	Rio de Janeiro
13-Feb-25	B737-7	Turbulence, injuring one cabin crew member.	near San Francisco
13-Feb-25	B747-4	ATB due engine failure.	over England
09-Feb-25	B787-9	Enroute cracks in main windshield.	San José
09-Feb-25	B787-9	Bird strike damaged no.2 engine.	Salalah
12-Feb-25	Growler	Crashed in go-around, ejected.	near San Diego, CA
17-Feb-25	CRJ	Destroyed following a landing accident. 4 crew and 76 pax survived.	Toronto Pearson
12-Feb-25	CRJ	Runway excursion taxiing off runway after landing.	Saint Louis-Lambert
10-Feb-25	C650	Wing struck parked aircraft while taxiing in.	Orlando Sanford
13-Feb-25	DHC8	ATB due engine failure on take-off.	Johannesburg
10-Feb-25	G200	Hit by a Lear35 that veered off the runway while landing	Scottsdale Airport,
10-Feb-25	Lear35	Lateral runway excursion on landing, struck a G200.	Scottsdale
11-Feb-25	Mi-8T	Forced landing with a failed left engine	Tazovsky Heliport
10-Feb-25	RAC690	Landed with an unlocked main landing gear that folded during touchdown.	Sorocaba
16-Feb-25	S100	Diverted due to depressurization.	Oblast



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Safety Conference Calendar

Year	Month	Day(s)	Org	Event	Location	Notes
2025	Feb	18th	FSF	Advancing Aviation Safety: Integrating Mental Health into Operational Excellence	Online	Webinar
2025	Mar	11 th - 12 th	NTSB	Automation In Transportation: Lessons For Safe Implementation	Washington DC	In person meeting
2025	Mar	12 th	UKFSC	470 th SIE	TBC	
2025	Mar	17 th – 20 th	Airbus	29 th Airbus Safety Conference	Amsterdam	
2025	Mar	17 th – 19 th	FRMS Forum	FRMS Forum Annual Conference	Santiago, Chile	
2025	Mar	19 th – 20 th	RAeS	RAeS Flight Operations Conference 2025: Single Pilot Operations - Logical Progression or a Step Too Far?	Hamilton Place, London	
2025	Mar	24 th – 28 th	CANSO	Global Safety Conference	Christchurch, NZ	
2025	Mar Apr	31 st – 1 st	IATA	34th Safety Issue Review Meeting	Montreal, Canada	
2025	Mar Apr	31 st – 2 nd	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Apr	2 nd – 3 rd	ERA	Safety Group	TBC	
2025	Apr	7 th – 9 th	ACSF	ACSF Safety Symposium	Embry Riddle, Daytona Beach, FL	Business aviation
2025	Apr	7 th – 9 th	FoF	Flight Operations Forum Norway 2025 – Communicate for Safety	Oslo airport	
2025	Apr	28 th -30 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	May	6 th – 7 th	FSF	70th Business Aviation Safety Summit	Charlotte, North Carolina	
2025	Jun	5 th – 6 th	FSF	Safety Forum 2025 Theme: People in the Centre of Aviation Safety	Eurocontrol, Brussels	
2025	Jun	24 th	UKFSC	471 st SIE	TBC	
2025	Aug	18 th – 20 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Sep	10 th	UKFSC	472 nd SIE	TBC	
2025	Sep	15 th – 17 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Sep/Oct	29 th – 4 th	ISASI	ISASI 2025 - Soaring to New Heights:A World of Innovation	Denver, Colorado	
2025	Oct	6 th – 7 th	SAE	Defence Aviation Safety Conference	London	
2025	Oct	14 th -16 th	IATA	World Safety and Operations Conference	Xiamen, China	
2025	Nov	4 th – 6 th	FSF	78th International Aviation Safety Summit	Lisbon, Portugal	
2025	Nov	10 th – 12 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Nov	11 th – 13 th	Bombardier	29th Bombardier Safety Standdown	Wichita, Kansas	
2025	Dec	2 nd	UKFSC	473 rd SIE	TBC	