



UK Flight Safety Committee

UKFSC News #06

17 Dec 2024



[BD 100 Fatal Loss of Control In-Flight](#)

NTSB



[Loss Of Pressurisation Control at Cruising Altitude](#)

SKYBRARY



[2024-0237-E: Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH MBB-BK 117: Rotors Flight Control – Tail Rotor Actuator – Inspection](#)

CAA PUBLICATION SERVICE - EASA EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE



[A Life in Pictures: Lucy Easthope and Disaster Recovery, 9th January 2025 14:00-15:30 CET](#)

EUROCONTROL - WEBINAR



[Fatigue Risk Management Conference](#)

EASA



[Path to Wellness: Charting a Course for Mental Health in Aviation](#)

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION



[Datalink in Europe: What Are the Rules?](#)

OPSGROUP



[Raising Passenger Awareness of Lithium Batteries](#)

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY



[ESF: Terrain Information Display and SVS Consultation](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE



[Comment Response Document: Part-ML MRO Parts](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE



[General Aviation FEEDBACK 102](#)

CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN FACTORS INCIDENT REPORTING PROGRAMME



[ATR 42-500, Runway Excursion at Gilgit Airport](#)

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF PAKISTAN



[A330 Severe Turbulence Encounter with 4 Serious & 20 Minor Injuries](#)

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD



[Guidance on RFFS Provision for Extraneous Duties and Helicopter Incidents](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE



[The Aviation Safety \(Amendment\) Regulations 2024](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE



[SAFOPS Request for Support Fly-by-turn performance](#)

EUROCONTROL SAFOPS



[Consultation for Special Condition – Cabin Evacuation protection from fuel tank explosion due to external fuel ground fed fire](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE



[SC Fuel Tank Crashworthiness](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE



[EASA publishes updated Easy Access Rules for Aircrew](#)

EASA



[ESF: Degraded Flight Instrument External Probe Heating Consultation](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE



[A320 Turbulence Encounter with 4 Serious and 5 Minor Injuries](#)

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD



[Performance based Navigation – CAA Consultation](#)

UK CAA



[B737, SWA1671 and Diamond DA40, N895AM, Runway Incursion, Long Beach, CA, 19th October 2024](#)

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD



[Aerosucre B722 Runway Overrun on Take-off, Bogota 10th Nov 2024](#)

DIRECCIÓN TÉCNICA DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE ACCIDENTES



[Recent Accidents & Incidents from the Air Safety Network Wikibase](#)

FSF AIR SAFETY NETWORK



[Safety Conference Calendar – 2 NEW](#)

UKFSC



[Back to Contents List](#)

SKYBRARY

Loss Of Pressurisation Control at Cruising Altitude

On 8 February 2022, an aircraft inbound to Madrid at FL340 experienced a failure of automatic pressurisation control followed almost three hours later by a failure of manual control and rapidly rising cabin altitude. An emergency was declared and descent made to FL120 where manual control was regained. The flight was completed without recurrence. The failure cause was found to have been water leaking from a tube with a broken clamp which, when it froze, had blocked the air conditioning outflow valve doors. Elements of the system design, scheduled maintenance requirements and fault detection were all identified as contributing factors.

[Final Report](#)



Björn Wylezich - stock.adobe.com

Safety Action taken by Delta Air Lines as a result of the findings of the Investigation was noted to have included replacement of all plastic clamps in the potable water distribution system with metal ones on all of its B767-300/400 aircraft with this action complete by 9 November 2022.

Related articles

- [Loss of Cabin Pressurisation](#)
- [Aircraft Pressurisation Systems](#)
- [Continuing Airworthiness](#)

Photograph from the NTSB report



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

BDI00 Fatal Loss of Control

The pilot conducting the exterior inspections was distracted by a catering delivery, resulting in the right-hand pitot cover remaining in place during take-off. The airspeed discrepancy resulted in a rejected take-off at 104kt. After clearing the runway, the aircraft stopped and the SIC exited and removed the pitot cover with the right engine running.

The investigation found that as a result of the airspeed discrepancy during the aborted take-off the horizontal stabilizer trim electronic control unit (HSTECU) latched an ADC1/ADC2 'Mis-compare' resulting in AP Stab Trim Fail and Rudder Limiter Fault (a no-go-item). While troubleshooting, the crew did not consult maintenance, who would have required a power down to reset the systems and ignored the 'No Go' Crew Alerting System (CAS) message.

In-flight 'with the autopilot engaged and the trim function inhibited, the autopilot subsequently alerted the flight crew to "AP HOLDING NOSE DOWN," which was meant to alert the crew that the autopilot was on, but that the airplane was out of trim and the autopilot was holding additional load on the flight controls.' Switching the Primary Stab Trim to OFF, when running the 'PRI Stab Trim Fail' checklist, the autopilot disengaged resulting in a 4g pitch up, in response, the PIC applied 90lb of forward pressure on the control column resulting in -2.4g.

Two of the passengers were not wearing seat belts, one of them was fatally injured during the upset. They had become accustomed to making their own determination of when it was safe to move around the cabin due to the pilot's habit of leaving the seat belt signs on all the time. 'About 17 minutes after the in-flight upset, the flight landed at the diversion airport. Later that day, the passenger succumbed to her injuries sustained during the in-flight upset.'

Probable Cause and Findings

The flight crew's failure to remove the right-side pitot probe cover before flight, their decision to depart with a No-Go advisory message following an aborted takeoff, and their selection of the incorrect non-normal checklist in flight, which resulted in an in-flight upset that exceeded the maneuvering load factor limitations of the airplane and resulted in fatal injuries to a passenger whose seatbelt was not fastened. Contributing to the severity of the in-flight upset were the pilot-in-command's (PIC) decision to continue the climb and use the autopilot while troubleshooting the non-normal situation, and the PIC's pilot-induced oscillations following the autopilot disconnecting from the out-of-trim condition. Also contributing to the accident was the crew's inadequate crew resource management. [Final Report.](#)

EASA

Fatigue Risk Management Conference

4-5 February 2025

EASA - and AESA (Spanish Authority) will host a Fatigue Risk Management Conference to discuss this important topic, share best practice.

Hybrid event. [Register here.](#)

CAA PUBLICATION SERVICE

Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH MBB-BK117: Rotors Flight Control – Tail Rotor Actuator – Inspection

EASA Emergency Airworthiness Directive. [View 2024-0237-E](#)

EUROCONTROL

A Life in Pictures: Lucy Easthope and Disaster Recovery Webinar

9th January 2025 14:00-15:30 CET

This webinar series delves into the lives and careers of inspirational people who have made a significant difference to the safety and performance of safety-critical industries. [Register here.](#)



[Back to Contents List](#)

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION

Path to Wellness: Charting a Course for Mental Health in Aviation

The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) has published [Path to Wellness: Charting a Course for Mental Health in Aviation](#).



Here's what they have to say about it on their [Mental Health and Wellness](#) page: 'The Foundation underscores the importance of addressing the stigma associated with mental health issues. Through a detailed examination of case studies, the Foundation illustrates the

consequences of neglecting mental health and the need for continuous support, rigorous screening, and a culture that encourages openness and assistance-seeking.'

'Also in this paper, the Foundation proposes a series of actionable strategies aimed at improving mental health support and practices within the industry. The Foundation emphasizes the need for a proactive approach to mental health management, focusing on early intervention, enhanced access to mental health resources, and the creation of a supportive work environment tailored to individual needs. By fostering a culture of openness, support, and collaboration, the industry can significantly advance its handling of mental health concerns, thereby ensuring the safety, well-being, and efficiency of its workforce and the flying public.'

The FSF will follow this up with a webinar on 18th February 2025, details to follow.

Also on the [Mental Health and Wellness](#) page [An Aviation Professional's Guide to Wellbeing](#) 'developed in 2020 by Flight Safety Foundation members, academic researchers and aviation professionals from across the industry. The Foundation published this document as part of its broader effort to help the industry cope with the personal and professional impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our industry works well because of the efforts of all the people involved and it is important to the industry's future for all of us to be as healthy mentally, physically and emotionally as possible.'



CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY



[CAA YouTube Video 'Do you know what's considered as a dangerous good?'](#)

Raising Passenger Awareness of Lithium Batteries

The CAA are running a [video campaign](#) on LinkedIn, X, YouTube and the CAA Website, to raise awareness among passengers of the risks posed by Lithium batteries and the importance of correct carriage on aircraft. The video includes interviews with passengers to explore their knowledge.

It links with the CAA web page '[What items can I travel with and which are restricted - Restrictions relating to checked in luggage and carry-on bags](#).' This explains all the rules and carriage requirements around all dangerous goods that may be carried by passengers.

The FAA also have a [Lithium battery awareness video](#) linked to their '[PackSafe for Passengers](#)' web page and '[PackSafe - Lithium Batteries](#)' page.



OPSGROUP

Datalink in Europe: What Are the Rules?

"There is a mandate for Datalink EQUIPAGE for flights above FL285 throughout Europe. There are various different exemptions for this.

This mandate only applies to aircraft with ATN Datalink. If your aircraft only has FANS I/A, you don't need to comply – but you also won't be able to get CPDLC across most of Europe.

There are also some places where Datalink LOGON is mandatory.

Datalink in Europe can be bamboozling – multiple chunks of airspace, all in close proximity to each other, all with varying levels of operating capability when it comes to CPDLC. Plus, there's a Logon List to consider. And a Datalink Mandate. And different considerations depending on what kind of Datalink you've got onboard...

So, here's a simple guide on how it all works, and what the rules are."

[Ops Group briefing here.](#)



[Back to Contents List](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE

ESF: Terrain Information Display and SVS Consultation

The UK CAA is consulting on an equivalent safety finding request in relation to Terrain Information Display and Synthetic Vision System applicable to CS-25 Large Aeroplanes.

The online consultation includes consultation paper UK.ESF.F.0002, the closing date for this consultation is 23 Dec 2024. [Provide feedback here.](#)

SW2024/337

UK CAA SKYWISE

Comment Response Document: Part-ML MRO Parts

In October 2024 the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) launched a 4-week public consultation on the Review of ORS9 Decision No. 24 - Part ML Maintenance and Repair Organisation (MRO) parts.

The CAA has now published [a comment response document](#) for this consultation. The CAA will be issuing a new ORS9 Decision to take effect from 1st January 2025. **SW2024/342**

CHIRP

General Aviation FB 102

Edition 102 reflects on some themes that endure, habitual practices, task pressures, complacency and lapses in situational awareness or not following procedures can all lead to unintended risks, even among experienced aviators.

FB 102 includes an interesting 'I Learned About Human Factors From That' article about confirmation bias and complacency as food for thought.

[GAFB 102](#)



Photo from the official accident report

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF PAKISTAN

ATR 42-500, Runway Excursion at Gilgit Airport
20th July, 2019

What Happened

‘While approaching Gilgit for Landing, the aircraft descended at speeds much higher than normal. As a result of higher speed and reduced reaction time, the aircraft was unable to extend Flaps 35 as a result of which the aircraft made a high-speed touchdown with Flaps 15. After touchdown, the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining length of Runway (R/W) and departed off the end of R/W. None of the passengers or crew sustained any injuries.’

Causes / Contributing factors

‘Primary Causes: -

- Involuntary Runway Excursion (RE) due intentional high-speed Approach and Landing by PF.
- Failure to adhere to SOPs.
- Lack of situational awareness and anticipation resulting in inadequate decision making.

Contributing Factors: -

- Lack of assertiveness by PM.
- Inadequate application of Crew Resource Management (CRM).‘

During the investigation the captain admitted to previous high-speed approaches and non-compliance with SOPs, but since the PIA FDA programme was not effective in detecting these, the opportunity for debriefing was lost.

Summary of Safety Recommendations to PIA With Respect to Northern Area Airfields

- DFDR analysis and debrief policy
- Aircrew with unsafe trends may be identified and necessary steps be taken
- Special training flights for aircrew to practice Go-Around
- Simulator practice to include practice Go-Around
- Aircrew refresher lectures aerodynamics and aircraft performance.
- Periodic check flights

Other Safety Recommendations for PIA

- CRM training:
 - F/O focus on communication, assertiveness and teamwork.
 - Captains to pay heed to the FO’s advice
- Landing procedures may include mandatory use of Thrust Reversers
- Aircrew training on evacuation SOP.
- Aircrew training to anticipate, be ready for and respond to variations.
- Data retention for the duration of an investigation

Safety Recommendations for PCAA

- PCAA proper oversight of FDA program
- Audit FDA and Aircrew debriefs yearly

[Final Report](#)



[Back to Contents List](#)



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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

A330 Severe Turbulence Encounter with 4 Serious & 20 Minor Injuries

Phoenix, Arizona to Honolulu, Hawaii. 18th December 2022

What happened

At FL400, the A330, was in visual meteorological conditions and above a cloud layer between FL370 and FL380. A cloud that the flight crew described as a “plume” appeared vertically in front of the airplane. The flight crew called the lead flight attendant to advise her about the anticipated turbulence. Within about 1 to 3 seconds, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence that resulted in multiple injuries in the cabin. QAR data showed that vertical accelerations greater than 2G.

The report states that: ‘National Weather Service issued a SIGMET (significant meteorological information) that was valid for an area of embedded thunderstorms to FL380 that included the turbulence encounter location. This SIGMET, which implied the potential for severe or greater turbulence, was provided to the flight crew. The NWS had also forecast moderate-to-severe clear air turbulence that was expected to develop behind the main area of precipitation.’

‘Thus, the conditions along the airplane’s flight route were favorable for convectively induced severe turbulence, and the flight crew was aware that thunderstorms and turbulence could occur along the flight route.’

Probable Cause and Findings

The NTSB determines the probable cause(s) to be:

The flight crew’s decision to fly over an observed storm cell instead of deviating around it despite sufficient meteorological information indicating the potential for severe convective activity. [Final Report](#)

The NTSB’s recommendations with respect to turbulence can be found in [Preventing Turbulence-Related Injuries in Air Carrier Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121](#).

[See also FAA AC 120-88A Preventing Injuries Caused by Turbulence](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE

Guidance on RFFS Provision for Extraneous Duties and Helicopter Incidents

The UK CAA has received enquiries from Aerodrome Operators about Rescue and Firefighting Services (RFFS) during extraneous duties and aircraft boarding, and helicopter incidents following ICAO’s reclassification of helicopters.

To help operators comply with regulatory requirements, new guidance has been produced to assess the timing and impact of ancillary duties on RFFS Response Objectives, as well as RFFS readiness for helicopter-related incidents. Please visit the CAA [RFFS webpage](#) for more details. **SW2024/338**

UK CAA SKYWISE

The Aviation Safety (Amendment) Regulations 2024

[The Aviation Safety \(Amendment\) Regulations 2024](#) have been published.

Amendments address changes to the Flight Operations regulations for All Weather Operations and Fuel/Energy Management Schemes. Associated amendments have also been made to the Aircrew and Aerodromes regulations.

Additionally, corrections to the Continuing Airworthiness regulation have been made following the introduction of Safety Management System requirements in 2023. **SW2024/340**



[Back to Contents List](#)

EUROCONTROL SAFOPS

SAFOPS Request for Support
Fly-by-turn performance

The requesting ANSP would like your support with an important issue regarding fly-by turn performance, which has been reported multiple times by their Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs). The issue concerns aircraft initiating turns early, with a low bank angle, which is causing a number of operational challenges within our airspace.

The most frequent issue reported involves aircraft turning too early and coming too close to TRAs (19 cases in 3 years).

Of even greater concern is the fact that an early turn becomes a contributing factor to a potential loss of separation. The requesting ANSP already faced 3 incidents within 1,5 years where the minimum separation distance has been infringed due to early turns, with ATCOs intervening to prevent potentially hazardous situations. While there have been no serious consequences so far, the number of potential near misses remains unclear; as controllers have been able to react quickly enough to prevent them.

Complete [the survey here](#).

EASA

EASA publishes updated Easy Access
Rules for Aircrew

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published a [new revision of the Easy Access Rules for Aircrew \(Regulation \(EU\) No 1178/2011\)](#).

This Revision from December 2024 introduces:

- the requirements for issuing type ratings for manned aircraft with a vertical take-off and landing capability to holders of a commercial pilot licence for aeroplanes or helicopters (Regulation (EU) 2024/1111); and
- amendments to the requirements for cruise relief co-pilots, to regular updates of flight crew licensing and aero-medical requirements, and to simplifications of flight crew licensing requirements for general aviation (Reg (EU) 2024/2076).

UK CAA

Performance based Navigation – CAA
Consultation

The CAA are proposing to amend and consolidate the regulations that govern Performance-based Navigation (PBN) in the UK.

This will support the development of a systemised, sustainable, and modernised airspace network.

The consultation closes on 16 January 2025.

Have your [say here](#).



UK CAA SKYWISE

Consultation for Special Condition –
Cabin Evacuation protection from fuel
tank explosion due to external fuel
ground fed fire

Consultation for a special condition to be used to protect the cabin occupants, during evacuation, from a fuel tank explosion triggered by an external ground fuel fed fire.

The CAA welcome you to [give your feedback](#), the closing date for this consultation is 27 December 2024 .

SW2024/346

UK CAA SKYWISE

SC Fuel Tank Crashworthiness

Consultation for a special condition to be used for the crashworthiness conditions of a conformal rear centre fuel tank installation on a large transport aeroplane.

The CAA welcome you [to give your feedback](#), the closing date For this consultation is 27 December 2024.

SW2024/345

UK CAA SKYWISE

ESF: Degraded Flight Instrument
External Probe Heating Consultation

The UK CAA is consulting on an equivalent safety finding request in relation to degraded flight instrument external probe heating system applicable to CS-25 Large Aeroplanes.

The online consultation includes consultation paper UK.ESF.F.0001, which sets out the full detail of the issue, and mitigating factors.

The CAA welcome you to [give your feedback](#), the closing date For this consultation is 25 December 2024.

SW2024/341

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD



A320 Turbulence Encounter with 4
Serious and 5 Minor Injuries

JetBlue Airlines flight 1256 encountered convective turbulence while in the cruise at 34,000 ft over the Caribbean Sea. The seatbelt signs were illuminated.

A post-accident review of meteorology data showed that there were no SIGMET advisories that were active for the accident.

NTSB Probable Cause and Findings

An inadvertent encounter with convectively induced turbulence during cruise that was not depicted by the airplane’s weather radar system. [Final Report](#).



[Back to Contents List](#)

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD



Photo from the NTSB report

B737, SWA1671 and Diamond DA40, N895AM, Runway Incursion, Long Beach, CA

The event timeline from the NTSB report, 19th October 2024:

‘1442:36 PDT, the crew of N895AM established communication with the local control one (LCI) controller and reported inbound on the Area Navigation (RNAV) Runway 30 Zulu approach. The LCI controller cleared N895AM to land on runway 30 and instructed the crew to hold short of runway 26 right for traffic.’

‘At 1446:46, the crew of SWA1671 established communication with the LCI controller and reported inbound for landing on runway 30. At 1447:20 the LCI controller cleared SWA1671 to land on runway 30.’

‘At 1449:50, the crew of N895AM advised the LCI controller they were holding short of runway 26 right on runway 30.’

‘At 1450:05, as SWA1671 was completing their landing roll out on runway 30, the crew of SWA1671 advised the LCI controller that there was an aircraft on runway 30.’ [Preliminary report.](#)

DIRECCIÓN TÉCNICA DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE ACCIDENTES



Aerosucre B722 Runway Overrun on Take-off, Bogota 10th Nov 2024

The aircraft was carrying out an improved climb take-off from a runway with a tailwind. They initially waited for 15 minutes for the tailwind to abate before commencing the take-off on Runway 14L with a surface wind of 280/9. They carried out a rolling take-off and at the end of the take-off roll felt and heard a loud impact.

Post flight revealed wheel damage, a tyre burst, plus damage to trailing edge flaps and the tail skid.

The improved climb technique requires the aircraft to achieve a higher than the minimum necessary take-off speed on the runway before getting airborne. This technique uses more runway distance.

The operator published the following internal communication to B727 and B737 crews:

‘1. If the tailwind exceeded 5 knots on the active runway, it was recommended to suspend the take-off procedure.

2. A joint assessment with the control tower was to be carried out to analyse the wind direction and intensity. Depending on the results, a prudent wait or a change of runway for takeoff could be considered.

3. The Operator's Dispatch has to be informed of the wind conditions in order to coordinate an adequate accompaniment to the flight, considering factors such as alternate destinations, weather conditions and hours of operation. ‘

Immediate Safety Recommendations

1. ‘In view of the critical nature of the Serious Incident investigated, it is recommended that the Aviation Authority prohibit the Enhanced Climb Takeoff procedure (for aircraft contemplating this maneuver), when there is a tailwind, or a component of tailwind, or if there are variable wind conditions that make its presence likely, regardless of the intensity.’
2. That the performance charts and weight and balance tables are validated for accuracy. The operators should implement a policy of taking the option that provides the greatest safety margin, for example a headwind take-off. The practice of using improved climb technique with a tailwind should be ceased,
3. Additional training in performance and weight and balance for pilots and dispatchers.
4. They recommend more frequent ramp inspections to be carried out by the regulator.

[CCTV of the impact on YouTube](#)

[Preliminary report in Spanish.](#)



[Back to Contents List](#)

Recent Accidents & Incidents from the Air Safety Network Wikibase

Date	Type	Event	Location
11-Dec-24	A320	FL340, cabin smoke, EMC descent, diversion	E of Zacatecas
12-Dec-24	A321	Engine 2 bird strike, diverted to JFK	New York-La Guardia
11-Dec-24	An24	No. 2 engine, oil leak, shutdown, diverted	Irkutsk Airport
13-Dec-24	ATR 72	Diverted to alternate, 'due technical: overspeed with flaps extended'	near Surgut Airport
13-Dec-24	ATR 72	PAN call due low fuel, diverted to alternate	Khanty-Mansi
11-Dec-24	B737-4	Lateral runway excursion RW22 Abuja	Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe
11-Dec-24	B737-7	Tyre burst on landing	Los Angeles Airport,
11-Dec-24	B737-8	FL370, cabin smoke, diverted	E of Comodoro
11-Dec-24	B737-9	FL310 windscreen cracked	SW of Novosibirsk
11-Dec-24	B737-2	FL220, engine No. 1 shutdown,ATB.	At 140 km southeast of Moscow
14-Dec-24	B777-3	ATB due technical. Engine failure unconfirmed.	near Addis Ababa
14-Dec-24	C525C	Bird strike on take-off, nose cone damage	Bozeman Yellowstone
11-Dec-24	C560	Struck by vehicle, taxiing for departure	Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta
10-Dec-24	C750	Main gear fire taxiing out. RFFS extinguished fire	Miami–Opa Locka
13-Dec-24	DHC-6	ATB due left rear door opening in flight, damaging the door and skin	Burlington Airport,
14-Dec-24	ERJ190	Damaged after being struck by the boarding bridge	Comodoro General Enrique Mosconi
10-Dec-24	AS350B	Training flight, encountered a gust of wind and ended up its on side	Los Alamitos
16-Dec-24	AS350B	Crashed in a field, pilot killed	about 5 km N of Potrero
11-Dec-24	G550	Struck unknown object, post flight inspection, RH engine cowl damage	West Palm Beach, FL
12-Dec-24	H900XP	Bird strike on approach, damaged LH flap	Easton/Newnam Field
09-Dec-24	MU-2B-60	Landed gear up RW25	Aiken Municipal Airport
14-Dec-24	R44	Emergency landing en-route	near Llanada Grande,
10-Dec-24	R44	Low rotor RPM. Forced landing. Main rotor cut tail h/c overturned.	Beterete Cué
09-Dec-24	R690B	Cracked windscreen, diverted	over the Baltic Sea,
13-Dec-24	SI00-95B	ATB due landing gear failure alarm after take-off	near Orada Chugli
13-Dec-24	SI00-95B	ATB, failed to pressurise, post flight open hatch found	near Saint Petersburg



[Back to Contents List](#)

Safety Conference Calendar

Year	Month	Day(s)	Org	Event	Location	Notes
2024	Nov	20 th	RIN	3rd Annual UK PNT Leadership Seminar	The Royal Society, London	GNSS Spoofing – RH to attend and report to SIE
2024	Dec	3 rd – 4 th	ERA	Joint Safety & Operations Group meeting	EASA HQ, Cologne	
2024	Dec	4 th	UKFSC	469 th SIE	Aviation House, Gatwick	
2025	Feb	4 th 5 th	EASA	EASA Fatigue Risk Management Conference	AESA, Spain	NEW! Hybrid meeting
2025	Mar	11 th 12 th	NTSB	Automation In Transportation: Lessons For Safe Implementation	Washington DC	NEW! In person meeting
2025	Mar	12 th	UKFSC	470 th SIE	TBC	
2025	Mar	TBC	Airbus	Airbus Safety Conference	TBC	
2025	Mar	19 th – 20 th	RAeS	RAeS Flight Operations Conference 2025: Single Pilot Operations - Logical Progression or a Step Too Far?	Hamilton Place, London	
2025	Mar	24 th – 28 th	CANSO	Global Safety Conference	Christchurch, New Zealand	
2025	Mar Apr	31 st – 1 st	IATA	34 th Safety Issue Review Meeting	Montreal, Canada	
2025	Mar Apr	31 st – 2 nd	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Apr	2 nd – 3 rd	ERA	Safety Group	TBC	
2025	Apr	28 th -30 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	May	6 th – 7 th	FSF	70th Business Aviation Safety Summit	Charlotte, North Carolina	
2025	Jun	5 th – 6 th	FSF	Safety Forum 2025 Theme: People in the Centre of Aviation Safety	Eurocontrol, Brussels	
2025	Jun	24 th	UKFSC	471 st SIE	TBC	
2025	Aug	18 th – 20 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Sep	10 th	UKFSC	472 nd SIE	TBC	
2025	Sep	15 th – 17 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Oct	6 th – 7 th	SAE	Defence Aviation Safety Conference	London	
2025	Nov	4 th – 6 th	FSF	78th annual International Aviation Safety Summit	Lisbon, Portugal	
2025	Nov	10 th – 12 th	UKFSC	FSO Course	Gatwick	
2025	Dec	2 nd	UKFSC	473 rd SIE	TBC	