



UK Flight Safety Committee


# UKFSC News #14

11 Feb 2025



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Photo from <https://heliteam.no/bildegalleri/>

NORWEGIAN SAFETY INVESTIGATION AUTHORITY

# AS350B Collision with Power Lines

‘In October 2024, the NSIA published their report into an Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B1 operated by Heli-Team AS, that became caught in and cut an overhead power line spanning the Gullesfjord in Troms on 6 September 2021. The incident occurred in connection with a line inspection of a power line. There were four people on board, and there were no personal injuries or damage to the environment. The NSIA is of the view that only coincidence prevented this incident from becoming a fatal accident. The way the helicopter caught the power cable and the commander’s manoeuvring after he became aware of it reduced the scope and consequences of the incident. After the helicopter’s rotor blade cut the power cable, the commander demonstrated good airmanship and performed a successful emergency landing.

The NSIA is of the opinion that inadequate preparation by the helicopter operator, planning and performance, the poor visibility of the line and the pilot’s limited experience of line inspections and high mental workload in the situation in question explain why the pilot did not become aware of the overhead power line spanning the fjord until a collision was inevitable.

During the inspection, the power supply fitters had identified a fault in the crossarm of an electricity pole. The power supply fitters wanted to return to the electricity pole in question to document the fault. The commander received the information and planned a right-hand turn to go back.

Without realising, he flew the helicopter under the overhead power line crossing the fjord. The commander started an ascending right-hand turn, and after approximately 180 degrees of the turn had been completed, the helicopter started to descend towards the location of the fault. At that moment, the commander became aware of the power line crossing the fjord and pulled the collective pitch control up hard, but a collision with the line was inevitable. The helicopter became caught in the middle of the three cables in the power line, which was then lifted over the northernmost cable. The helicopter was briefly stuck in the power line before the rotor blade cut the cable it was caught in. The helicopter was damaged in the impact, but the rotor blade was not critically damaged and the flight controls were intact, enabling the commander to perform a controlled emergency landing.

In 2010 CAA Norway granted an exemption from marking the cables. CAA Norway concluded, without much justification, that the power line spanning the fjord did not constitute an obstacle to aviation and referred, among other things, to the fact that Statnett’s overhead power line spanning the fjord just south of it was marked. The NSIA believes that this may be a misjudgement. The fact that one of the two overhead power lines spanning the fjord was marked may further reduce the visibility of the unmarked line by drawing attention away from it.

The result may thus be an increased risk of collision.

The NSIA recommends CAA Norway to reconsider its decision and assess whether the power line spanning the Gullesfjord should be physically marked. Nor can the NSIA rule out that other aviation obstacles may have been exempted on the same grounds and has asked CAA Norway whether such exemptions are in place for other power lines. CAA Norway has informed the NSIA that it has reviewed decisions relating to overhead power lines with an exemption or partial exemption from the marking obligation from 2009 onwards. The NSIA recommends CAA Norway to follow up overhead power lines that are exempt or partially exempt from the marking obligation in order to verify that they are marked in accordance with the Regulations on reporting, registration and marking of aviation obstacles.

The NSIA is of the opinion that it was difficult for the pilot to see the power line the helicopter collided with. It did not stand out in relation to the background, and a light drizzle meant that the commander had to use the windshield wiper. The line occupied a relatively small part of the field of vision, and, as it was not marked, it had no visual elements that attracted his attention. Since the helicopter flew towards the crossing line and thus had limited relative movement, there was little to attract the pilot’s visual attention.’

[NSIA Report](#)



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Image by Albert Jaime Casanova from Pixabay

PILOTS WHO ASK WHY

# What Went Wrong with the Boeing 737 MAX? The Why Spotlight #4

‘The Boeing 737 MAX crisis shook the aviation world to its core. Two horrible crashes in less than five months left the industry scrambling to understand how something so catastrophic could happen

Today, we’re going to dive into what went wrong: from design flaws to poor oversight, and how pilot training failures played a role in the tragedy.

We’ll break down the main differences in the 737 MAX’s design compared to other Boeing 737’s, the controversial MCAS system, and what led to the crashes.’ [Read the full article here.](#)



Photo <https://ops.group/blog/nat-ops-blue-spruce-routes/>

OPSGROUP

## NAT Changes 2025: No More Blue Spruce Routes

‘Once (or sometimes twice) every year, ICAO update their NAT Doc 007 – the main guidance doc for ops over the North Atlantic. All the specifics about how to operate your aircraft safely through the complex airspace of the region are here.

**There’s a new one that has just been published for March 2025, which contains a few important changes to know about if you’re planning a flight across the NAT.** You can download the new NAT Doc 007 on the [ICAO page](#), but here’s a summary of the main changes...[Read more.](#)



Photo from the accident report

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

## E190 Loss of Control

The interim report of the Azerbaijan E190 accident states that the aircraft reported a loss of GPS navigation and attempted two NDB approaches to Grozny before diverting back to Baku. The CVR then records what are described as repeated sonic booms. The autopilot and auto-throttle disconnected, and all the hydraulic system pressure was lost. Cabin pressurization was lost. The crew reported controlling the aircraft with throttles and diverting to Aktau but crashed short of the runway. They found holes in the fuselage, vertical stabilizer, stabilizer, elevator and foreign object damage to hydraulic pipes and flight control wiring.

The report recommends risk assessing flights to areas of known GPS loss.

Note: On the same day two A-22 Foxbat light aircraft, modified as unmanned attack aircraft, were shot down near Grozny by the Pantsir air defence system of missiles and 30mm guns. [Interim report.](#)

SKYBRARY

## Unexpected Go Arounds Should Be Routinely Trained in The Simulator

‘On 6 December 2019, an aircraft below Decision Altitude on an ILS approach at Paris Orly was unexpectedly instructed to go-around in day VMC without explanation. The go around was mishandled and the aircraft began to descend after initially climbing which triggered EGPWS Warnings and controller alerting before recovery was achieved. It was suspected that surprise at the go-around and the early climbing turn **required may have initiated the crew’s mismanagement of automated flight path control with further surprise leading to failure to revert to manual control when they no longer understood the automated system responses to their inputs.**’ [Learn more.](#)

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## CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

## Laser Attacks Podcast

We are highlighting again the UK CAA podcast about the continued risk of laser attacks. A new podcast aimed at pilots, flight crew, ATC and operational staff is highlighting the continued risk of laser attacks on aircraft and the importance of reporting them. The UK CAA receives approximately 1400 reports of laser interference each year with police and air ambulance services experiencing higher rates of strikes per flight due to lower and slower flights that operate in or around residential areas.

### The Impact on Air Ambulances

A laser incident is a serious distraction for any flight crew, but for air ambulances it can also delay vital medical treatment reaching patients on the ground. The episode features crew members from Yorkshire Air Ambulance Service (YAA) who have seen an increase in lasers being shone at their aircraft. Technical Crew Member Alex Clark describes one incident where a laser beam hit his eye, resulting in a burnt cornea. Listeners will also hear from YAA Chief Pilot Owen McTeggart who shares his experience of laser attacks, the risks for pilots and crew, and the procedures they have in place following an incident.

**“...if a pilot gets blinded by a laser, that's kind of that job over, if not a catastrophe... I've had it climbing out of a hospital. But luckily, I'm in a climb phase where I can engage the autopilot, so it's a massive distraction, I had to look away from the laser, I couldn't look where I wanted to go...”** (Yorkshire Air Ambulance Chief Pilot, Owen McTeggart)

### Resources for Flight Crew

Dr Ewan Hutchison from the UK CAA Medical Department, was part of a working group that collaborated with the police to develop a self-assessment tool for flight crew to use if they are exposed to a laser. He describes the work behind the aviation laser exposure self-assessment (ALESA) tool and how pilots, flight crew and ATCOs can use it. The tool can be kept in a flight bag and helps inform a decision on whether to see an eye specialist.

### How Reporting Can Drive Enforcement

Laser attacks on aircraft are a criminal offence and penalties can include unlimited fines and up to five years in prison.

James Cunningham, Head of Aviation Safety for the National Police Air Service (NPAS) is also featured in the episode and explains that it is vital for UK airspace users to report incidents to their local police force, in addition to making a Mandatory Occurrence Report to the UK CAA.

**“I really can't stress enough the importance of both submitting an MOR and in due course, thereafter a crime..... even if it's two to three days afterwards, please just submit that anyway. It'll drive that crime reference number which drives policing activity”.**

(James Cunningham, Head of Aviation Safety at the National Police Air Service (NPAS))

<https://podfollow.com/caa-safety-files>





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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

B737 Tail Strike

United Airlines flight 2498 experienced a tail strike while landing at George Bush Houston Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. The flight was a regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight from Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport (PHX), Phoenix, Arizona to IAH.



Photo by robin stock.adobe.com

The flight crew statements, and flight data showed a stable approach to the landing flare. The first officer was pilot flying and stated he began the flare slightly late. Both crewmembers stated the touchdown was firm with a slight “nose-high” bounce. **The flight crew was not aware the airplane’s tail had impacted the runway until the ground crew at the gate notified them.**

Flight data showed that the airplane touched down on the runway with a 6.5-degree nose-up attitude and vertical acceleration of 1.87g. The speed brakes deployed two seconds after the initial touchdown. At the same time, the aircraft became airborne again and the nose began to lower. Two seconds later, as the speed brakes **retracted, the airplane’s pitch began to increase, and the airplane touched down a second time with pitch of 7.2 degrees** and a vertical acceleration of about 2.87g. The airplane became airborne for a 3rd time for about a second before it touched down for the final time. The nose was lowered to the ground, and speed brakes were extended again.

Post-accident assessment of the aircraft revealed substantial damage to the auxiliary power unit (APU) firewall **bulkhead that occurred as a result of the aircraft’s aft fuselage’s contact with the runway.**

The NTSB determined the probable cause to be: - **The airplane’s aft fuselage impacted the runway as a result of a delayed flare and subsequent nose-high pitch inputs during the aircraft’s multiple touchdowns.**

UK CAA SKYWISE

Restricted Airspace (Temporary) – Kincardine, Scotland – 13 February 2025  
DRONE ONLY

Restriction of Flying Regulations for drones and remotely piloted aircraft systems only at Kincardine on 13 February 2025. Details by NOTAM and in [Briefing Sheet \(BFS 006/2025\)](#) on the [NATS website](#).

SW2025/023

AIR BUSAN

Air Busan Bans Power Banks in Cabin Overhead Lockers

Following a fire in an overhead locker, Air Busan has banned power banks from being stored in cabin overhead lockers. The fire was caused by a power bank, resulting in an evacuation at the departure gate and ultimately burnt through the roof of the fuselage.

[Reuters](#)

UK CAA SKYWISE

Upcoming Changes to Manchester Low-Level Route

The Manchester Low-Level Route (MLLR) will be replaced by the North West Transit Corridor (EGR323) on 20 February 2025.

The airspace will reclassify to Class G with new operational requirements, including an increased altitude of 1,500 feet AMSL and widened boundaries.

Pilots should review [AIC Y 004/2025](#) for more details. Updated VFR charts will be available in April 2025.

SW2025/022

UK CAA PUBLICATION

SN-2025/001: Robinson Helicopters Time-Controlled Components and Service Life Limited Components

The purpose of this Safety Notice is to highlight the UK CAA requirements for the control of time-controlled and life-limited parts.

[View SN-2025/001.](#)

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Recent Accidents & Incidents from the Air Safety Network Wikibase

Date	Type	Event	Location
<a href="#">05-Feb-25</a>	AW109	Crashed on take-off in fog.	Near Parma
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	A320	Diverted due thermal runaway a passenger's power bank at FL370.	N of Athens
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	A321	Bird Strike.	Jacksonville
<a href="#">07-Feb-25</a>	An26	ATB due engine failure.	Magadan Oblast
<a href="#">05-Feb-25</a>	ATR72	Severe turbulence, one FA injured.	Recife
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	B350 KA	Operated by a US defence contractor crashed in Ampatuan	Ampatuan
<a href="#">07-Feb-25</a>	B F90 KA	Crashed after take-off.	Barra Funda
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	Bell 206	Dynamic rollover during rotors running refuelling	Bentong, Pahang
<a href="#">05-Feb-25</a>	Bell 206	Crashed roughly one mile from the airfield under unknown circumstances.	Polokwane Airport
<a href="#">05-Feb-25</a>	B737-8	Impacted two swans during initial climb	London-Gatwick
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	B737-7	Struck a bird on approach damaging an engine.	Orlando
<a href="#">05-Feb-25</a>	B737-8	GCOL.Tail impacted by a taxiing B787 wing while parked for de-icing.	Seattle
<a href="#">05-Feb-25</a>	B737-8	ATB. Cracked windscreen after take-off.	Near Istanbul
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	B787-10	Diverted due to a low engine oil warning at FL370.	Okinawa Island
<a href="#">05-Feb-25</a>	B787-9	Right wing impacted the tail of a parked B737 while taxiing in.	Seattle
<a href="#">03-Feb-25</a>	C208B	Runway excursion following brake failure.	Boa Vista-Malboro
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	C208B	Crashed while en-route from Unalakleet to Nome,Alaska.	Norton Sound
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	Mirage	Both pilots ejected following a system malfunction.	Sunari Chowki
<a href="#">04-Feb-25</a>	Emb P600	Bird Strike	near Boca Raton
<a href="#">03-Feb-25</a>	R22	Force landed and rolled over in a field	Hurst
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	R44	Crashed after it collided with a drone.	La Rita de Ticabán
<a href="#">09-Feb-25</a>	S269C	Crashed under unknown circumstances in a forest	Hofberg
<a href="#">06-Feb-25</a>	Twin Otter	Runway excursion on landing.	Kerema Airstrip
<a href="#">09-Feb-25</a>	Yak-42D	ATB due technical at FL290.	Bardymsky District



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Safety Conference Calendar

Year	Month	Day(s)	Org	Event	Location	Notes
2025	Feb	4 <sup>th</sup> - 5 <sup>th</sup>	EASA	<a href="#">EASA Fatigue Risk Management Conference</a>	AESA, Spain	Hybrid
2025	Feb	18 <sup>th</sup>	FSF	<a href="#">Advancing Aviation Safety: Integrating Mental Health into Operational Excellence</a>	Online	Webinar
2025	Mar	11 <sup>th</sup> 12 <sup>th</sup>	NTSB	<a href="#">Automation In Transportation: Lessons For Safe Implementation</a>	Washington DC	In person meeting
2025	Mar	12 <sup>th</sup>	UKFSC	470 <sup>th</sup> SIE	TBC	
2025	Mar	17 <sup>th</sup> – 20 <sup>th</sup>	Airbus	29 <sup>th</sup> Airbus Safety Conference	Amsterdam	
2025	Mar	17 <sup>th</sup> – 19 <sup>th</sup>	FRMS Forum	<a href="#">FRMS Forum Annual Conference</a>	Santiago, Chile	
2025	Mar	19 <sup>th</sup> – 20 <sup>th</sup>	RAeS	<a href="#">RAeS Flight Operations Conference 2025: Single Pilot Operations - Logical Progression or a Step Too Far?</a>	Hamilton Place, London	
2025	Mar	24 <sup>th</sup> – 28 <sup>th</sup>	CANSO	<a href="#">Global Safety Conference</a>	Christchurch, NZ	
2025	Mar Apr	31 <sup>st</sup> – 1 <sup>st</sup>	IATA	<a href="#">34<sup>th</sup> Safety Issue Review Meeting</a>	Montreal, Canada	
2025	Mar Apr	31 <sup>st</sup> – 2 <sup>nd</sup>	UKFSC	<a href="#">FSO Course</a>	Gatwick	
2025	Apr	2 <sup>nd</sup> – 3 <sup>rd</sup>	ERA	<a href="#">Safety Group</a>	TBC	
2025	Apr	7 <sup>th</sup> – 9 <sup>th</sup>	ACSF	<a href="#">ACSF Safety Symposium</a>	Embry Riddle, Daytona Beach, FL	Business aviation
2025	Apr	7 <sup>th</sup> – 9 <sup>th</sup>	FoF	<a href="#">Flight Operations Forum Norway 2025 – Communicate for Safety</a>	Oslo airport	
2025	Apr	28 <sup>th</sup> -30 <sup>th</sup>	UKFSC	<a href="#">FSO Course</a>	Gatwick	
2025	May	6 <sup>th</sup> – 7 <sup>th</sup>	FSF	<a href="#">70th Business Aviation Safety Summit</a>	Charlotte, North Carolina	
2025	Jun	5 <sup>th</sup> – 6 <sup>th</sup>	FSF	<a href="#">Safety Forum 2025 Theme: People in the Centre of Aviation Safety</a>	Eurocontrol, Brussels	
2025	Jun	24 <sup>th</sup>	UKFSC	471 <sup>st</sup> SIE	TBC	
2025	Aug	18 <sup>th</sup> – 20 <sup>th</sup>	UKFSC	<a href="#">FSO Course</a>	Gatwick	
2025	Sep	10 <sup>th</sup>	UKFSC	472 <sup>nd</sup> SIE	TBC	
2025	Sep	15 <sup>th</sup> – 17 <sup>th</sup>	UKFSC	<a href="#">FSO Course</a>	Gatwick	
2025	Sep/Oct	29 <sup>th</sup> – 4 <sup>th</sup>	ISASI	<a href="#">ISASI 2025 - Soaring to New Heights: A World of Innovation</a>	Denver, Colorado	
2025	Oct	6 <sup>th</sup> – 7 <sup>th</sup>	SAE	<a href="#">Defence Aviation Safety Conference</a>	London	
2025	Oct	14 <sup>th</sup> -16 <sup>th</sup>	IATA	<a href="#">World Safety and Operations Conference</a>	Xiamen, China	
2025	Nov	4 <sup>th</sup> – 6 <sup>th</sup>	FSF	<a href="#">78th International Aviation Safety Summit</a>	Lisbon, Portugal	
2025	Nov	10 <sup>th</sup> – 12 <sup>th</sup>	UKFSC	<a href="#">FSO Course</a>	Gatwick	
2025	Nov	11 <sup>th</sup> – 13 <sup>th</sup>	Bombardier	<a href="#">29<sup>th</sup> Bombardier Safety Standdown</a>	Wichita, Kansas	
2025	Dec	2 <sup>nd</sup>	UKFSC	473 <sup>rd</sup> SIE	TBC	