**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 464th UKFSC SIE MEETING – 12 SEPTEMBER 2023**

**1. 2 x B777 had encountered severe turbulence leading to cabin crew injuries. A B737 crew on go-around between 140-200 ft received a “DON’T SINK” warning due to TS-induced windshear. A further erroneous take-off performance calculation event involved an A320 on an intersection take-off; the calculations had been based on an additional 500m of runway. (2.1)**

**2. Confidential reporting suggested a breakdown in levels of trust between crews and management, and a lack of engagement with crews. (2.3)**

**3. FAA AC 120-123 on flight path management was a good document but needed to be read in full; companies were encouraged to develop policies on manual flying accordingly. (2.4)**

**4. The CAA was aligning with EASA changes to fuel policy (Statutory Instrument due in March 24). Caution required to prevent fuel carriage being reduced to unacceptable levels. (2.4)**

**5. Need to improve comms between blue-light helicopter operators, HLS owners and event managers. (2.5)**

**6. Weak speed compliance leading to go-arounds and delays. (2.7)**

**7. FOD (runway and RET) arising from brake unit failures depositing debris. (2.10)**

**8. Cabin crew injuries during turbulence while carrying out safety checks; passengers need to understand personal responsibilities and compliance with seat belt signs. Operators should consider threats to cabin crew from turbulence encounters. (2.12)**

**9. 2 x near-miss events during use of air start units and crews starting ‘wrong’ engine. Possible HF issue with OEM and operator SOP differences. APU INOP generates some significant hazards. (2.13)**

**10. Concerns expressed on risks from circling approaches, questions about handling of go-around from any point during the procedure. (2.14)**

**Dai Whittingham**

**Chief Executive**

**UKFSC**