

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 400th UKFSC SIE MEETING
17th MAY 2011

1. Activity Reports on laser attacks measures from the CAA, RAF and Eurocontrol. (Para 3.1, para 4.1, para 5.8.3)
2. Concerns expressed on GNSS vulnerability and reliability of GNSS in a joint letter to the CAA. (Para 3.2 and para 5.10.1))
3. Meeting between North Sea helicopter operators and RAF to improve Class G airspace co-ordination. (Para 3.3 and para 5.5.1)
4. Continuing activity to address the excessive use of 121.5. (Para 3.4)
5. The use of IPADS as Reference source to support a tailored trip kit is approved by the CAA (Para 3.5 and para 5.12.5)
6. Generic advice on stall recovery developed by the FAA with the major manufacturers is being made available but its official status remains uncertain. (Para 3.6)
7. A revision of the Disruptive Passenger Guidance, previously published by the UKFSC, is now available for Airlines to consider and use as appropriate. (Para 3.7, para 5.12.4)
8. The joint input to the Begg Enquiry has been welcomed and recommendations taken. (Para 3.8, para 5.11.1)
9. A recent runway incursion incident at night indicates the value of undertaking airport van runs at night. (Para 3.9)
10. Potential value of using FDM data to investigate a series of incidents involving inadvertent application of brakes during the take-off roll. (Para 3.10)
11. Responses to EASA Flight Time Limitations proposals continue to be monitored and discussed. (Para 3.12)
12. TCAS Trg and the interaction between STCA and ACAS. (Para 3.13, para 5.12.3)
13. Dyslexia amongst the pilot community. (Para 3.17 and para 5.8.2))
14. Eurocontrol publishes version 2 of the Eurocontrol Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Incursions published. (Para 4.1)
15. Latest guidance on responsibilities of airlines and airports for handling of Persons of Restricted Mobility. (Para 4.1)
16. AAIB concern about the trend towards the late reporting of incidents by some airlines. (Para 5.1)

17. A incident involving an engine fire on the ground raises concerns that some flight crews and groundcrews are uncertain about the correct hand signals to indicate a fire. (Para 5.1.1)
18. During rectification on the ramp, the engine start switch was left on, causing an inadvertent engine start with personnel close by when the APU was later selected. (Para 5.1.1)
19. Older B757 aircon pack failures still leading to smoke and fumes in the cockpit and depressurisation due to 2nd pack failures. (Para 5.1.1)
20. The Military commence mandatory training for its duty holders(accountable managers) (Para 5.2.1)
21. Value in review of individual airlines' Napping Policy after Mangalore accident demonstrates the dangers. (Para 4.1 and para 5.6.1)
22. Non-use of APUs on turn rounds leading to external doors being opened and left without steps outside. (Para 5.6.1)
23. Questionnaire to investigate pilot/controller mismatch of expectations during holding and with speed management in the terminal zone areas. (Para 5.7.1)
24. NATS callsign tool sees significant reduction in callsign confusion incidents. (Para 5.7.1)
25. Concern about the lack of training before the introduction of new software for aircraft operations. (Para 5.8.1)
26. CAA seeks industry views on improving the current MOR scheme. Para 5.9.2)
27. Significant EASA Regulation changes due in July 2011 to impact ATM and the airlines. (Para 5.10.1)
28. Potential impact on focusing on short and high speed turnoffs rather than the correct touchdown causing unstable approaches, and worse. (Para 5.12.1)
29. Collection of advice on the importance of establishing and retaining a just culture for effective incident reporting. (Para 5.12.7, para 5.12.9, para 5.12.1)
30. Advice to address configuration warnings on take-off. (Para 5.12.10)

Rich Jones
Chief Executive
May 2011