

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 400th UKFSC SIE MEETING
17th MAY 2011

1. **Activity Reports on laser attacks measures from the CAA, RAF and Eurocontrol. (Para 3.1, para 4.1, para 5.8.3)**
2. **Concerns expressed on GNSS vulnerability and reliability of GNSS in a joint letter to the CAA. (Para 3.2 and para 5.10.1))**
3. **Meeting between North Sea helicopter operators and RAF to improve Class G airspace co-ordination. (Para 3.3 and para 5.5.1)**
4. **Continuing activity to address the excessive use of 121.5. (Para 3.4)**
5. **The use of IPADS as Reference source to support a tailored trip kit is approved by the CAA (Para 3.5 and para 5.12.5)**
6. **Generic advice on stall recovery developed by the FAA with the major manufacturers is being made available but its official status remains uncertain. (Para 3.6)**
7. **A revision of the Disruptive Passenger Guidance, previously published by the UKFSC, is now available for Airlines to consider and use as appropriate. (Para 3.7, para 5.12.4)**
8. **The joint input to the Begg Enquiry has been welcomed and recommendations taken. (Para 3.8, para 5.11.1)**
9. **A recent runway incursion incident at night indicates the value of undertaking airport van runs at night. (Para 3.9)**
10. **Potential value of using FDM data to investigate a series of incidents involving inadvertent application of brakes during the take-off roll. (Para 3.10)**
11. **Responses to EASA Flight Time Limitations proposals continue to be monitored and discussed. (Para 3.12)**
12. **TCAS Trg and the interaction between STCA and ACAS. (Para 3.13, para 5.12.3)**
13. **Dyslexia amongst the pilot community. (Para 3.17 and para 5.8.2))**
14. **Eurocontrol publishes version 2 of the Eurocontrol Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Incursions published. (Para 4.1)**
15. **Latest guidance on responsibilities of airlines and airports for handling of Persons of Restricted Mobility. (Para 4.1)**
16. **AAIB concern about the trend towards the late reporting of incidents by some airlines. (Para 5.1)**

17. **A incident involving an engine fire on the ground raises concerns that some flight crews and groundcrews are uncertain about the correct hand signals to indicate a fire. (Para 5.1.1)**
18. **During rectification on the ramp, the engine start switch was left on, causing an inadvertent engine start with personnel close by when the APU was later selected. (Para 5.1.1)**
19. **Older B757 aircon pack failures still leading to smoke and fumes in the cockpit and depressurisation due to 2nd pack failures. (Para 5.1.1)**
20. **The Military commence mandatory training for its duty holders(accountable managers) (Para 5.2.1)**
21. **Value in review of individual airlines' Napping Policy after Mangalore accident demonstrates the dangers. (Para 4.1 and para 5.6.1)**
22. **Non-use of APUs on turn rounds leading to external doors being opened and left without steps outside. (Para 5.6.1)**
23. **Questionnaire to investigate pilot/controller mismatch of expectations during holding and with speed management in the terminal zone areas. (Para 5.7.1)**
24. **NATS callsign tool sees significant reduction in callsign confusion incidents. (Para 5.7.1)**
25. **Concern about the lack of training before the introduction of new software for aircraft operations. (Para 5.8.1)**
26. **CAA seeks industry views on improving the current MOR scheme. Para 5.9.2)**
27. **Significant EASA Regulation changes due in July 2011 to impact ATM and the airlines. (Para 5.10.1)**
28. **Potential impact on focusing on short and high speed turnoffs rather than the correct touchdown causing unstable approaches, and worse. (Para 5.12.1)**
29. **Collection of advice on the importance of establishing and retaining a just culture for effective incident reporting. (Para 5.12.7, para 5.12.9, para 5.12.1)**
30. **Advice to address configuration warnings on take-off. (Para 5.12.10)**

**Rich Jones
Chief Executive
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