

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - 388th MEETING UKFSC
6TH MAY 2009

1. The Pushback Working Group has formed under the Heathrow Manoeuvre Area Safety Team to address safety issues relating to pushback procedures. (Para 3.1)
2. The NATS Multi-crew Resource Management Course for pilots and controllers to develop a better understanding of each others working environment is producing positive feedback. (Para 3.5)
3. The latest situation on the ICAO SID/STAR Climb Phraseology issue was briefed by the CAA. (Para 4.5.14)
4. Using the recent Super Puma accident as an example, a brief on procedures and considerations for accident investigation was provided by the AAIB. (Para 4.1.1)
5. The Dutch Interim Report on the Turkish B737 was discussed and concern expressed about internet comment denying that this could happen to a UK operator, when incident reports demonstrate the contrary. (Para 4.1.3)
6. Recommendation that airlines should have a written procedure for capturing the glideslope from above and that the prescribed technique be practiced. (Para 4.1.3)
7. MOD DARS is assisting Boscombe Down to develop a training course for aircrews who engage in post maintenance flight testing. (Para 4.2.3)
8. Feedback from ATSOCAS users is sought by the ASI website as part of a 6 month review. (Para 4.2.4)
9. An incident in SE Asia with similar circumstances to the Turkish Airlines was reported. (Para 4.5.1)
10. Valuable lessons learned to improve runway and taxiway inspection regimes during snow and ice conditions at a UK airport. (Para 4.5.2)
11. Analysis of a series of mis-selection of flap incidents has highlighted distraction as the major factor in such incidents. (Para 4.5.6)
12. The use of a positive 'speed checked' calls by the PNF before selection of any flap surface change was recommended as a countermeasure to incorrect flap selection in the air. (Para 4.5.7)
13. Post C2 maintenance, the failure to reconnect the static pressure lines to an air data computer on an A320, causes a flight test overspeed and a consequent major inspection requirement. This failure is top of the Airbus list of major maintenance error concerns. (Para 4.5.8)
14. With post maintenance issues continuing to occur, the recommendation is made that only experienced crews are rostered for the ferry flight, even if the schedule does not require a formal flight test. Also, if the maintenance schedule includes work on

**engines or flight controls, it is recommended that the ferry is conducted by day only.
(Para 4.5.8)**

**15. Guidance and approval for the use of 'Runway Ahead' markings as a countermeasure to runway incursions at UK airports will be issued by the CAA shortly.
(Para 4.5.10)**

16. The CAA seeks comment on a proposal to change the method of distribution and access to the MOR scheme. (Para 4.5.11)

17. A significant increase in incidents involving the use of bright lights and lasers against aircraft leads to co-ordinated action by the CAA and police and a request for immediate reporting of such incidents. (Para 4.5.12)

18. The introduction of TCAS software version 7.1 as a mandatory item by ICAO has been placed on hold. (Para 4.5.14)

19. The Nav Data Providers highlight difficulties with codeing the revised ICAO SID/STAR Climb procedures to Eurocontrol. (Para 4.5.15)

20. Several Member airlines agree to support a proposal to compile a UKFSC Hazard Register using individual airline information. (Para 4.5.16)

**21. Although acceptable alternatives have yet to be identified, the EU exemption for the use of halon in certain aviation fire suppressant applications is to be withdrawn.
(Para 7.5)**

**Rich Jones
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UK Flight Safety Committee
10 May 2009**