NO 49 CHIRP AIR TRANSPORT BOARD MEETING AT FARNBOROUGH

6 OCTOBER 2008 – UKFSC CE SUMMARY

 

·                    The agenda for the 49th CHIRP ATAB.

 

·                    Under matters arising, the following points were addressed:

 

o       Further advice and guidance on Emergency Descent Procedures was still awaited from the ATSD in the CAA.

o       Numerous ideas to address the reception problems with the Luton ATIS have been investigated, but all have proven impractical so far. A digital solution is now being pursued by NATS.

o       The misunderstandings on surface wind reporting are being addressed through publication of information in Feedback and the UKFSC Minutes.

o       Inadequate or worn signage on runway and taxiways is being addressed in the MAST at Heathrow.

o       The difficulties encountered with obtaining wx information from OHWEB had now been overcome.

 

·                    Under item 6, Security Reports were discussed at length. The CHIRP CE had met with the AOA CE and the BAA Director of Security to discuss the continuing and significant number of security reports being received.

 

o       The ATAB agreed that while the DfT policy for security at UK airports was understandably robust, there was a need to address the practical application of the policy at individual airports. The existence of the MATRA – the committee at each airport - to address all aspects of security policy and its application was highlighted.  Airlines were encouraged to engage with their respective MATRAS in order to build a relationship with the security providers and to address the areas of concerns. Interaction of security and flight crews to generate a common understanding of each other’s point of view was the objective.

 

·                    Under 6, the ATAB debated the use of Pan and Mayday calls. Specifically, the correct use of the Pan call which should be ‘PANPAN, PANPAN, PANPAN’. Also, whether the use of the prefix PAN or MAYDAY ahead of the callsign when transferring frequencies was still necessary. The consensus view was that use of the prefix on initial contact was useful for situational awareness for ATC and other units on frequency, but this did not require repetition on every subsequent call on frequency.

 

·                    The policy of diversion fuel selected by individual airlines was debated at length. NATS pointed out that the current practice of an aircraft commander transmitting his intent to ‘divert in 10 minutes’ is of limited value. ATC will only take such information into account once the actual diversion commences. The number of aircraft that a diversion airfield can accept is limited. Only at the point of diversion will the diversion airfield availability be known. Ultimately, the aircraft commander is responsible for nominating his fuel allocation and diversion strategy – but this needs training for flight crews by airlines which takes into account the ATC responsibilities and diversion methodology in its risk management and assessment.

 

·                    A number of reports indicate poor communication of SOP changes within airlines. Airlines should think carefully about the techniques being used to communicate SOPs, especially when mergers and recruiting is underway.

 

·                    Under EASA, fatigue limitations and the risk assessments that underpin them will be included under SMS in the future.

 

·                    The ATAB went on to discuss the policy behind 3-pilot operations on long range operations. The general consensus was that having 3 pilots available on the flight deck did not achieve anything other than 3 tired pilots vice 2. From 2009, a separate and isolated pilot rest area would be required for a 3rd pilot, if this policy was to be continued to be used.

 

·                    The onset of autumn into winter provided an opportunity for the ATAB to re-emphasise the need for anti-icing techniques and requirements to be promulgated across the airlines.

 

·                    One CHIRP report critical of the advice emanating from the ATAB indicated a lack of understanding of the ATAB representation and process. This will be addressed by a publicity push which explains the background, expertise and care involved in considering CHIRP Reports.

 

·                    Several reports highlighted abuses and misunderstandings of take-off calculations by flight crews; in particular, the selection and sense of wet or dry V1 speeds. After lengthy discussion, the ATAB also identified a potential mismatch between the classification of wet/dry/flooded etc by ATC and the correlation with the figures selected for the V1 calculations. An important training issue!

 

·                    Concerns were raised about the increasing pressures on FTLs and the amount of time available for crews to study SOPs, departure changes etc and plan their flight. Report times are being squeezed throughout the industry – sufficient pre-flight study time was seen as essential.

 

·                    An effective Fatigue Rate Monitoring System can be useful tool to highlight reporting time pressures and problems. It often also identifies that individuals are more susceptible to errors being made in the final phases of flying cycles.

 

·                    Sickness policy is creating concerns with flight crews in certain airlines in that pressures are being applied by some airlines for crews not to report in sick and to work through illness.

 

·                    A non UK airline crew undertook a dangerous practice pilot incapacitation procedure when operating on behalf of a UK airline. It is incumbent on the contracting out airline to know your contractors – negligent entrustment is a live issue in these days of SMS.

·                    Are your flight crews aware of the dangers in releasing the evacuation slides around terminal buildings without checking the situation outside of the window?  The slide can be a lethal weapon in such circumstances for those out on the ground.

 

 

Rich Jones

Chief Exec

UK FSC

 

14 Oct 2008